Jefferson\u27s Failed Anti-Slavery Priviso of 1784 and the Nascence of Free Soil Constitutionalism by Merkel, William G.
MERKEL_FINAL 4/3/2008 9:41:47 AM 
 
555 
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Nascence of Free Soil Constitutionalism 
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ABSTRACT 
Despite his severe racism and inextricable personal commit-
ments to slavery, Thomas Jefferson made profoundly significant con-
tributions to the rise of anti-slavery constitutionalism.  This Article 
examines the narrowly defeated anti-slavery plank in the Territorial 
Governance Act drafted by Jefferson and ratified by Congress in 1784.  
The provision would have prohibited slavery in all new states carved 
out of the western territories ceded to the national government estab-
lished under the Articles of Confederation.  The Act set out the prin-
ciple that new states would be admitted to the Union on equal terms 
with existing members, and provided the blueprint for the Republi-
can Guarantee Clause and prohibitions against titles of nobility in the 
United States Constitution of 1788.  The defeated anti-slavery plank 
inspired the anti-slavery proviso successfully passed into law with the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787.  Unlike that Ordinance’s famous anti-
slavery clause, Jefferson’s defeated provision would have applied 
south as well as north of the Ohio River. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: JEFFERSON AND SLAVERY 
Thomas Jefferson, once the object of wide veneration, is no 
longer universally beloved among academics and intellectuals.  In-
deed, one could state this proposition more boldly: more than a few 
contemporary historians, cultural theorists, and belles-lettrists appear 
to dislike Jefferson more intensely than most of us dislike anyone ac-
tually living and with whom we are personally familiar, for better or 
for worse.  To be sure, most (but not all) of these highly critical 
voices disavow any personal malice towards Jefferson.  Yet in a great 
many cases, the disavowals have the air of mere polite forms of words, 
while the animosity lingers palpably on the printed pages of recent 
books and journals.1
Perhaps legal academics are more forgiving in their assessments 
of Jefferson than the humanists.2  Scholars and advocates of religious 
liberty in particular continue to celebrate Jefferson as a pioneer, or at 
least a committed progressive.3  Still, in the law schools as in other 
 1 See, e.g., JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 
(2001); Paul Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery: Treason Against the Hopes of the World 
[hereinafter Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery], in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES 181 (Peter S. 
Onuf ed., 1993); Michael Zuckerman, The Power of Blackness: Thomas Jefferson and the 
Revolution in St. Domingue, in ALMOST CHOSEN PEOPLE: OBLIQUE BIOGRAPHIES IN THE 
AMERICAN GRAIN 175–218 (1993); Conor Cruise O’Brien, Thomas Jefferson: Radical and 
Racist, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1996, at 53–74.  Pauline Maier’s denial of animosity 
towards Jefferson has about it a gleam of truth, but her form of words is closely repli-
cated by others who might be suspected of harboring less charitable opinions.  See 
PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, at 
xvii (1997) (“Perhaps I should also explain I bear no animus towards Jefferson.  
True, I once nominated him the most overrated person in American history . . . .”).  
For a balanced assessment of Jefferson and many of his recent detractors, see Benja-
min Schwartz, What Jefferson Helps to Explain, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, at 60–72. 
 2 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, 
MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 55–76 (2005) (on Jefferson’s 
sage and public spirited political judgment during the electoral crisis of 1800); LARRY 
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
45–49 (2004) (on Jefferson’s constitutional principles, with particular reference to 
separation of powers and democratic legitimacy); Jack N. Rakove, Our Jefferson, in 
SALLY HEMINGS AND THOMAS JEFFERSON: HISTORY, MEMORY, AND CIVIC CULTURE 210–35 
(Jane Ellen Lewis & Peter S. Onuf eds., 1999) (on Jefferson’s constitutionalism); 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ ET AL., THOMAS JEFFERSON AND BOLLING V. BOLLING: LAW AND THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 24–26, 58–66 (1997) (a glowing 
account of Jefferson’s lawyerly talent). 
 3 See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 3 (2002).  That 
said, scholars of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom are much more likely to 
accept a central role for John Locke in Jefferson’s thought than are scholars of the 
Declaration of Independence.   See FRANCIS D. COGLIANO, THOMAS JEFFERSON: 
REPUTATION AND LEGACY 165 n.44 (2006).   Interestingly, even Leonard Levy, who 
perhaps did as much as anyone to usher in the modern phase of post-hagiographic 
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fora, Jefferson has come under closer invigilation in recent years, and 
lost much of his former luster in the process.4  But if truth be told, 
Jefferson—while often widely revered—has never been universally be-
loved.  Enormously controversial in his own lifetime, the third Presi-
dent of the United States was simultaneously an apostle of liberty to 
his supporters, a wild-eyed zealot to his critics, and a scheming hypo-
crite to his staunchest opponents.  His public image was contested 
while he lived and has ebbed and flowed since his death, frequently 
being co-opted or disowned by one side or another in national politi-
cal struggles focused on order and liberty, localism and federal au-
thority, individualism and the collective good, the utility and mean-
ing of history, and even the meaning of (moral) meaning.5
For all the rancor associated with the Jeffersonian image 
through the course of American history, no aspect of Jefferson’s life, 
thought, and work has attracted more critical attention and hostile 
reaction over the last forty-some years than his involvement with—
and stance toward—African American slavery.6  The heightened scru-
tiny of recent decades has served a useful corrective purpose regard-
ing Jefferson’s connection to slavery, which some earlier, more 
hagiographic writers had frequently been quick to gloss over and ex-
plain away.  Few would now deny that Jefferson’s complex and trou-
bled (or simply troubling?) relationship with slavery was animated by 
attitudes towards African Americans that were at times more malign 
Jefferson studies, acknowledges Jefferson’s bona fides respecting religious liberty.  See 
LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 4–8 (1963). 
 4 See Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery, supra note 1, at 211–12 (“Yes, there had 
been ‘treason against the hopes of the world.’  The treason was by that generation 
which failed to place the nation on the road to liberty for all.  No one bore a greater 
responsibility for that failure than the author of the Declaration of Independence—
the Master of Monticello.”).  The phrase “treason against the hopes of the world” is 
Jefferson’s, who used it in 1820 to describe the guilt that would attend the break-up 
of the Union (and hence a betrayal of the spirit of 1776 and thus failure of the one 
shining example of republican governance in the world) if the Missouri Crisis were 
not abated and resolved.  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes (Apr. 22, 
1820), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1434 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
 5 MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE JEFFERSON IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND (1960), is 
the classic study of Jefferson’s multifaceted and highly politicized image from his 
death to the mid-twentieth century.  Francis D. Cogliano provides an updated and 
contemporized perspective on various aspects of Jefferson’s reputation and legacy.  
See COGLIANO, supra note 3.  The express linkage of Jefferson to the problem of dis-
covering the meaning of (moral) meaning goes back at least as far as nineteenth-
century biographer James Parton, who in 1874 mused “if Jefferson was wrong, Amer-
ica is wrong.  If America is right, Jefferson was right.”  Gordon S. Wood, The Trials 
and Tribulations of Thomas Jefferson, in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES, supra note 1, at 395. 
 6 See generally Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery, supra note 1; GARRY WILLS, “NEGRO 
PRESIDENT”: JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER (2003); Zuckerman, supra note 1; 
O’Brien, supra note 1. 
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than munificent.  And today, the stark contrast between the avowal of 
liberty in the Declaration of Independence and the practice of slavery 
in Jeffersonian America angers and intrigues historians, as it once 
angered and intrigued some of Jefferson’s contemporaries.7  Why in-
deed, one might ask with Dr. Johnson, were the loudest yelps for lib-
erty heard from the drivers of Negroes?8  The question cannot lightly 
be dismissed; but neither, I suggest, are the contradictions between 
Jeffersonian practice and principle as simple and straightforward as 
some scholars now assume. 
When Jefferson died on July 4, 1826 (fifty years exactly since the 
first public reading of his celebrated proclamation in favor of univer-
sal liberty), most of his remaining slaves passed with his bankrupt es-
tate into the hands of receivers and thence to the auction block.  Jef-
ferson freed only five slaves in his will, all members of the Hemings 
family, and so very probably blood relatives of his long deceased wife, 
Martha.9  In two cases, the manumitted were probably, or at least pos-
 7 See, e.g., PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE 
AGE OF JEFFERSON, at ix (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter FINKLEMAN, SLAVERY AND THE 
FOUNDERS]. 
[D]espite Jefferson’s fine words and our belief in this credo, it is clear 
that liberty was not available to most African-Americans at the time of 
the founding. . . .  I argue that Jefferson himself, who owned over 150 
slaves when he wrote the Declaration, did not in fact believe that blacks 
were entitled to the same rights as other Americans. 
Id. 
 8 Johnson’s famous query, “How is it that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty 
among the drivers of negroes?,” appeared originally in the pamphlet TAXATION NO 
TYRANNY: AN ANSWER TO THE RESOLUTION AND ADDRESS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 
(1775), reprinted in JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON 876 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998) 
(1791). 
 9 It has long been widely assumed that Jefferson’s father-in-law John Wayles lived 
in more or less open concubinage with his slave Betty Hemings, and thus became the 
father of Sally Hemings, who relocated to Monticello along with her mother and 
other family members after Wayles’ death in 1774.  The question whether any mem-
bers of the next generation of Hemings were the children of Thomas Jefferson and 
Sally Hemings (presumably Mrs. Martha Wayles Skelton, Jefferson’s half-sister) has 
famously provoked heated debate, impassioned denial, and painstaking genetic 
analysis.  See, e.g., Eugene A. Foster et al., Jefferson Fathered Slave’s Last Child, NATURE, 
Nov. 5, 1998, at 27; Eric S. Lander & Joseph J. Ellis, Founding Father, NATURE, Nov. 5, 
1998, at 13. The Jefferson Foundation’s official position is that Thomas Jefferson’s 
paternity of some of Sally Hemings’ children is highly probable.  See REPORT OF THE 
RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON THOMAS JEFFERSON AND SALLY HEMINGS (2000), 
http://www.monticello.org/plantation/hemingscontro/jefferson-hemings_report.p 
df.  Nevertheless, prominent voices may still be heard in defense of the old scholarly 
consensus that a relationship between Sally Hemings and Thomas Jefferson was 
unlikely.  See, e.g., JEFFERSON-HEMINGS SCHOLAR’S COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE 
JEFFERSON-HEMINGS MATTER (2001) (Dr. Paul Rahe, dissenting), http://www.tjherit 
age.org/scholars.html.  To my knowledge, neither Jeffersonian historians nor Jeffer-
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sibly, Jefferson’s own children.10  But Jefferson’s anti-slavery legacy is 
hardly as hollow as many recent commentators—Joseph Ellis, Paul 
Finkelman, and Conor Cruise O’Brien among them—insist.11  For all 
his racism, which these writers rightly emphasize, Jefferson never ac-
cepted the legitimacy of slavery.  The man who played a leading role 
in ushering America towards independence could also see himself as 
the target of a justifiable revolution by his own slaves.  In 1800, when 
a major uprising of Virginia slaves under the leadership of Gabriel 
(or Gabriel Prosser) was narrowly averted, Jefferson urged deporta-
tion rather than execution of the slave conspirators, on the grounds 
that their actions were legally justified.12
Jefferson’s letter to Governor James Monroe three weeks after 
the failed uprising, urging the Governor to “stay the hand of the exe-
cutioner,”13 was not the only action of Jefferson’s long life that could 
plausibly be labeled “anti-slavery.”  His argument in a provincial free-
dom suit of 177014 anticipated the Somerset decision of 1772, in which 
Lord Chief Justice Mansfield held that slavery was incompatible with 
the common law.15  His proposed Constitution for Virginia of 1783, 
son’s descendants have ever expressed reservations about the assumptions that John 
Wayles cohabited with Betty Hemings and that he was Sally Hemings’ father. 
 10 See FAWN M. BRODIE, THOMAS JEFFERSON: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 466 (1974).  The 
persons freed in Jefferson’s will were Burwell (no surname), John Hemings, Joe Fos-
set, Madison Hemings, and Easton Hemings.  Sally Hemings, fifty-three years old in 
1826, was not emancipated.  Id.  Madison Hemings, aged twenty-one, and Easton 
Hemings, aged eighteen, were her sons; her other light-skinned children had already 
“run-away” or passed into the white community.  Id. 
 11 ELLIS, supra note 1, at 90; Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery, supra note 1, at 181–
83; O’Brien, supra note 1, at 68–72. 
 12 See William G. Merkel, To See Oneself as a Target of Justified Revolution: Thomas 
Jefferson and Gabriel’s Uprising, 4 AM. NINETEENTH CENTURY HIST. 1 (2003). 
 13 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Sept. 20, 1800), in 9 THE 
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 145 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905) [hereinafter WORKS 
OF JEFFERSON]. 
 14 There is no official report of the case, Howell v. Netherland (1770), but Jeffer-
son’s argument for the claimant is found in THOMAS JEFFERSON, REPORTS OF CASES 
DETERMINED IN THE GENERAL COURT OF VIRGINIA FROM 1730 TO 1740 AND FROM 1768 TO 
1772 [hereinafter JEFFERSON, REPORTS OF CASES], reprinted in 1 WORKS OF JEFFERSON, 
supra note 13, at 470–81.   David Thomas Konig of Washington University in St. 
Louis, who is completing a comprehensive study of Jefferson’s legal thought and ca-
reer, reports that Jefferson argued six freedom suits (all of them pro bono) between 
1767 and 1776.  See David Konig, Antislavery in Jefferson’s Virginia:  The Incremental 
Attack on an Entrenched Institution (June 18, 2006) (unpublished conference paper 
for “Too Pure an Air: Law and the Quest for Freedom, Justice, and Equality,” Univer-
sity of Gloucestershire, UK) (on file with author). 
 15 Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.).  The official report is 
more readily available at 20 Howell’s State Trials 1, 79–82.  The most complete and 
accurate transcript of the case, including the argument of counsel and supporting 
briefs, is housed at the New York Historical Society on Central Park West, where it 
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composed while constitutional revision appeared likely in the Old 
Dominion, included a gradual emancipation clause that would have 
freed all persons born to enslaved mothers in the state after 1800.16  
And in December 1806, with the federal constitutional prohibition 
against abolition of the slave trade soon scheduled to lapse, President 
Jefferson successfully pressed Congress to abolish the slave trade at 
the earliest possible juncture.17  Jefferson made still other anti-slavery 
overtures in his earlier years,18 but in this Article my focus is squarely 
on his draft of the Territorial Governance Act (or Ordinance) of 
1784, which contained a clause that would have barred slavery from 
all of the new American nation’s western territories after 1800, had it 
not failed to pass by the narrowest possible margin.19
The Territorial Governance Act was drafted by Jefferson during 
the winter of 1783–1784, when he served a brief stint with the Con-
can be found in the folder labeled “Granville Sharp Papers (miscellaneous manu-
scripts in his hand.).”  On the significance of Somerset, see also Symposium, Somerset’s 
Case Revisited, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 601 (2006) (featuring a major article by George 
Van Cleve and comments by Daniel Hulsebosch and Ruth Paley). 
 16 In the end, Virginia summoned no constitutional convention in 1783 and the 
Constitution of 1776 remained in force until 1830, but Jefferson’s proposal was re-
printed in early editions of the Notes on Virginia.  See Thomas Jefferson, Draught of a 
Fundamental Constitution for the Commonwealth of Virginia (1783) [hereinafter Jefferson, 
Draught Constitution], reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 
app. at 213–14 (William Peden ed., 1954) (1787) [hereinafter JEFFERSON, NOTES ON 
VIRGINIA]. 
 17 Thomas Jefferson, 6th Annual Message (1806), in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, at 477–79 (Albert E. Bergh & Andrew A. Lipscomb eds., 1904) [hereinaf-
ter WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON]. 
 18 In Notes on Virginia, Jefferson reported that the Committee of Revisors, Thomas 
Jefferson, Edmund Pendleton, and George Wythe, who were charged shortly after 
independence with undertaking a revision of Virginia’s laws for submission as indi-
vidual bills to the state legislature, drafted a proposed statute to provide for compre-
hensive gradual emancipation linked to colonization of the freed persons to loca-
tions outside the commonwealth.  See JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA, supra note 16, at 
137–38.  This plan was to be presented as an amendment to Bill No. 51 on slavery 
once that bill was brought forward, but was not included in the report the Revisors 
made to the Assembly, lest its publication prior to actual legislative deliberation pro-
voke a fatal conservative backlash.  See id.  The amendment was never moved, and no 
transcript of it survives.  See Thomas Jefferson, A Bill Concerning Slaves, in 2 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 471–72 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1952) [hereinafter PAPERS 
OF JEFFERSON].  Jefferson’s explanation that the emancipation scheme was kept out of 
the public light for reasons of legislative strategy appears credible given the extreme 
reaction to other emancipation proposals of the era.  Cf. Letter from Thomas Jeffer-
son to James Madison (Aug. 3, 1797), in 29 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra, at 489 (on the 
fate of St. George Tucker’s emancipation proposal submitted to the Virginia General 
Assembly in 1797). 
 19 See PLAN OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE WESTERN TERRITORY, REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE (Mar. 1, 1784) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE], in 6 PAPERS OF 
JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 581–617. 
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federation Congress before departing to take up a diplomatic post in 
France that kept him in Europe until 1788.20  The Act marked the 
first effort of the national government under the Articles of Confed-
eration to organize and administer the newly created National Do-
main, the western reserve of territory stretching from the Atlantic 
seaboard states to the Mississippi River, forged from the cessions (and 
to be supplemented by anticipated future cessions) of the Atlantic 
states’ western claims.21  The remaining sections of this Article ex-
plore and contextualize Jefferson’s drafting of the Act, assess its status 
as a fundamental constitutional instrument, and evaluate the mean-
ing and legacy of its defeated anti-slavery proviso. 
Part II of the Article explains that the Act created a binding, en-
trenched system of reciprocal obligations, committing the existing 
states to future admission of new states whose rights and duties would 
mirror those of the established members of the Confederacy, even as 
it obligated the formative new states to adopt five core principles of 
republican governance and society.22  In the process, the Act pro-
vided a template for three future clauses of the United States Consti-
tution.  As drafted, it reaffirmed the prohibition against titles of no-
bility contained in the Articles of Confederation,23 introduced into 
American constitutional discourse language that developed into the 
Republican Guarantee Clause of the Constitution of 1788,24 and pro-
posed a prohibition on slavery in all future western states after 1800.25  
 20 See id. at 582–86; DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE VIRGINIAN 403–23 (1948). 
 21 See PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL 
CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1775–1787, at 149–72 (1983). 
 22 See 6 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 587–600 (ed. note); ORDINANCE OF 
1784 (U.S.) [hereinafter ORDINANCE OF 1784], in 6 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, at 613–15. 
 23 Compare id. at 608 (Jefferson’s proposed language that the “respective [new 
state] governments shall . . . admit no person to be a citizen who holds any heredi-
tary title”), and ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI (U.S. 1781) (“nor shall the 
United States in Congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of nobility”), 
with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United 
States”), and U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . grant any Title of No-
bility.”). 
 24 Compare ORDINANCE OF 1784, supra note 22, at 614 (quoting  Jefferson’s pro-
posal “[t]hat their respective governments shall be [in] republican [forms]” (passed 
into law in Territorial Governance Act)), with U.S. CONST. art IV, § 4 (“The United 
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Govern-
ment”). 
 25 See PLAN OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE WESTERN TERRITORY, REVISED REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE (Mar. 22, 1784) [hereinafter REVISED REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE], in 6 
PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 608 (“That after the year 1800[] of the Chris-
tian [ ]era, there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the said 
states, otherwise than in punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been 
convicted to have been personally guilty.”). 
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While the Ordinance became law, Jefferson’s clause prohibiting titles 
of nobility was rejected by a clear margin, and that prohibiting west-
ern slavery after 1800 failed by a single vote.26  Jefferson’s defeated 
anti-slavery language of 1784 resurfaced under other hands in the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which prohibited slavery with ostensi-
bly immediate effect in the territories north of the Ohio River, but 
left slavery unaffected in the southwest.  The Ordinance of 1787, 
unlike that of 1784, was burdened by a fugitive slave clause.27  Jeffer-
son’s defeated anti-slavery clause is significant not just because of 
what it might have been, but more importantly because of what it 
eventually became.  Minus the fugitive slave clause imposed in 1787, 
the language drafted by Jefferson in 1784 was revived almost verbatim 
by the Reconstruction Congress in 1865 as Section 1 of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, finally prohibiting for all time slavery and invol-
untary servitude in the United States.28 
Part III of the Article addresses academic critique of Jefferson’s 
defeated proviso, in particular the claim that Jefferson laid little stock 
in the clause or in anti-slavery principles.29  It makes the countervail-
ing claim that Jefferson’s common lawyerly world view and Whigish 
constitutionalism30 steered him in the direction of cautious anti-
 26 See id. at 611–12 n.21; see also infra notes 156–63 and accompanying text. 
 27 Article 6 of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 provides: 
[t]here shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said 
territory, otherwise than in punishment of crimes whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted: Provided, always, That any person es-
caping into the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in 
any one of the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed 
and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service as 
aforesaid. 
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE art. 6 (U.S. 1787). 
 28 Compare REVISED REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 25, at 608 (Jefferson’s 
proposed language of 1784 that “there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude in any of the said states, otherwise than in punishment of crimes whereof the 
party shall have been [duly] convicted to have been personally guilty”), with U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIII § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a pun-
ishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
the United Sates, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”). 
 29 See Paul Finkelman, Treason Against the Hopes of the World: Thomas Jefferson and 
Slavery, in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES, supra note 1, at 179, 199–200, reprinted in 
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 7; Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the 
Northwest Ordinance, 1787: A Study in Ambiguity, 6 J. OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 343 (1986) 
[hereinafter Finkelman, Northwest Ordinance]. 
 30 On Jefferson as a common lawyer, see generally EDWARD DUMBAULD, THOMAS 
JEFFERSON AND THE LAW (1978); SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 2.  On Jefferson’s Whig-
ish constitutionalism, see DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON (1994).   David Thomas Konig of Washington University in St. 
Louis is at work on what promises to be the definitive treatment of Jefferson’s legal 
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slavery, especially where anti-slavery policy could be squared with his 
perceived need to maintain bonds of social control preserving white 
safety against rebellion in areas with substantial populations of en-
slaved and oppressed African American laborers.31  Part III builds the 
related argument that Jefferson’s commitment to anti-slavery in the 
West was less timid than his anti-slavery vision for his own state of Vir-
ginia with its large enslaved population.  Even respecting Virginia—at 
least prior to the Haitian Revolution and the poignant example of 
justified large-scale white extermination at the hands of slave rebels—
Jefferson was willing to contemplate and evaluate serious anti-slavery 
measures.32  This differentiates his understanding of the constitu-
tional posture of emancipation from that of populist property-
focused pro-slavery petitioners, who threatened Lockean revolution 
against the Virginia authorities in the event of anti-slavery legisla-
tion.33
Part IV explores the question of enforcement of constitutional 
and statutory anti-slavery norms under the Articles of Confederation 
and under the pre-Reconstruction Constitution.  Enforcement 
Clauses did not come into being until the Reconstruction Congresses 
passed and the states ratified the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments.34  Under the antebellum understanding of the 
“federal consensus” as under the Articles of Confederation, Congress 
lacked the power to attack slavery in those states where it already ex-
thought.  Some of Konig’s provisional findings were presented in Konig, supra note 
14. 
 31 For the view that Jefferson was cautiously anti-slavery, see generally WILLIAM W. 
FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY, 1776–1854, at 121–23 
(1990); DUNCAN J. MACLEOD, SLAVERY, RACE AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 126–30 
(1974); and William W. Freehling, The Founding Fathers and Slavery, 77 AM. HIST. REV. 
81 (1972).  Both authors stress that Jefferson’s anti-slavery views did not translate into 
a successful anti-slavery agenda. 
 32 See my argument in William G. Merkel, Race, Liberty, and Law: Thomas Jeffer-
son and the Problem of Slavery, 1776–1800 (Nov. 27, 2007) (unpublished D. Phil. 
Thesis, Oxford University) (on file with author). 
 33 The Southside Virginia pro-slavery petitions of 1784–1785 are reprinted and 
analyzed in Frederike Teute Schmidt & Barbara Ripel Wilhelm, Early Pro-Slavery Peti-
tions in Virginia, 30 WM. & MARY Q. 133, 133–46 (1973). 
 34 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article 
by appropriate legislation.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5 (“The Congress shall have 
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”); U.S. 
CONST. amend. XV § 2 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation.”).  On the origins of these clauses and their departures from 
prior practice, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 143–44 
(1998), and HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835–1875, at 275–78 (1982). 
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isted.35  But criticism of Jefferson’s 1784 proviso on grounds of non-
enforceability makes little sense given the conception of plenary fed-
eral power over the Western territories that prevailed in 1784,36 and 
indeed survived as the dominant paradigm until Dred Scott announced 
that the federal power over the territories applied only to regulating 
land as land, and only to territories existing in 1787.37  Part IV at-
tempts a real-minded assessment of the potential enforceability of the 
1784 Anti-Slavery Clause in the West.  While granting that slavery 
might well have been inevitable in the lower tier of the old southwest 
(Alabama and Mississippi), Part IV maintains that the narrowly failed 
proviso may well have had a sufficient deterrent effect on slaveowners 
to tip Kentucky and Tennessee toward freedom. Part V concludes the 
Article, and suggests links between Jefferson’s early free-soil overtures 
and the free-soil constitutionalism that eventually brought the Repub-
licans to power in 1860, setting the stage for the final climactic show-
down over slavery and, in due course, the slow rebirth of freedom.38
 
 35 See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTI-SLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
AMERICA, 1760–1848 passim (1977). 
 36 See ONUF, supra note 21, at 41–46 & passim. 
 37 See generally Am. Ins. Co v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) and WIECEK, 
supra note 35, at 114–55, for the pre-Dred Scott understanding.   Scott v. Sandford, 60 
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), is analyzed in meticulous detail in DON E. FEHRENBACHER, 
THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 365–88 
(1978), which discusses Chief Justice Taney’s tortured reasoning respecting federal 
power in the territories. 
 38 On the role of Jefferson’s image in anti-slavery Republican thought, see 
PETERSON, supra note 5, at 190–91, and ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: 
THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR WITH A NEW 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY (1995) [hereinafter FONER, FREE SOIL].  On the thwarted at-
tempt to realize the egalitarian ideals of the Declaration after the Civil War, see ERIC 
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1867 (1990) 
[hereinafter FONER, RECONSTRUCTION]. 
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II. THE ORDINANCE OF 1784 
Jefferson rejoined Congress at Annapolis in December 1783, after 
a period of withdrawal from public life following the death of his wife in 
September 1782.39  He spent some six months with that somewhat fee-
ble national assembly, before departing on a five-year mission to 
France.40  During his time with the Confederation Congress, Jefferson 
    39 MALONE, supra note 20, at 401–18. 
 40 Id. 
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devoted himself to affairs of state with a degree of diligence and fervor 
entirely uncharacteristic of the post-war, pre-Constitution national as-
sembly.41  With the possible exception of securing final ratification of 
the Treaty of Paris, his greatest concern as a congressional delegate was 
the creation and organization of the National Domain.42  This desire to 
assure a republican future for the West produced what many historians 
long considered the most far-reaching of his unsuccessful anti-slavery 
efforts, the slavery prohibition proviso in the Territorial Government 
Ordinance of 1784. 
Jefferson’s special concern for issues touching the West developed 
many years before his return to the Continental Congress.  Williams-
burg’s habitual disdain for the concerns of his native Albemarle pro-
voked Jefferson’s indignation even as a student at William and Mary, as 
a youthful Burgess, and as an attorney at the General Court whose prac-
tice focused on the concerns of western clients.  This resentment of 
Tidewater influence along the frontier fuelled Jefferson’s hostility to 
primogeniture and entail, and hastened his support for shifting the 
Capital upriver to Richmond.  With western self-determination in mind, 
Jefferson played an influential role in establishing Kentucky as a county 
in 1776.43  His proposed Virginia constitution of the same year con-
tained radical land grant proposals,44 favoring landless western settlers 
over speculators and absentee owners, and provided for the separation 
of new states from Virginia’s western reaches.  From the beginning 
then, the West’s democratic possibilities, and the dangers inherent in 
land mongering and speculation, were central to Jefferson’s republican 
vision of national destiny.45
Jefferson did not have a hand in Virginia’s initial cession of her 
vast western domains to the Continental Congress in January 1781.  At 
the time, he held the Governor’s office, and maintained a scrupulous 
distance from legislative proceedings.46  But as the doyen of progressive 
historians Merrill Jensen suggested nearly seventy years ago, the cession 
can be viewed as the culmination of Jefferson’s five-year struggle to win 
 41 Id. at 411–12. 
 42 Id. at 412–16. 
 43 Id. at 250–57. 
 44 See Thomas Jefferson, Third Draft, Before 13 June, 1776, in 1 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, 
supra note 18, at 356.  Jefferson’s first two drafts also contained the fifty-acre universal 
land grant provisions, but this clause was struck from the more conservative version fi-
nally enacted by the General Assembly. 
 45 See MALONE, supra note 20, at 258–59; see generally PETER S. ONUF, JEFFERSON’S 
EMPIRE, THE LANGUAGE OF AMERICAN NATIONHOOD 33–36 & passim (2000). 
 46 For an analysis of Jefferson’s strict view of separation of powers when he as-
sumed the Governor’s office, see MAYER, supra note 30, at 57–66. 
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support for his precocious opinion favoring the creation of “free and 
independent colonies” from the Old Dominion’s western claims.47  To 
Jensen, Jefferson was the ideological godfather of both the Virginia ces-
sion and the National Domain.48  Jefferson’s draft state constitution of 
June 1776 contained the earliest proposals by any Virginian for laying 
off the western lands as independent, sovereign republics.49  With his 
draft constitution of 1776, Jefferson became the first Virginian to aban-
don the extensive boundary claims of the original London Company 
Charter, the same document that frequently formed the basis of his ar-
guments against Parliamentary authority over Virginia during the revo-
lutionary period.50  That Charter, however, encompassing territory that 
was ultimately carved into six mid-western states, remained the principal 
bulwark of a prominent lobby of speculators and Virginia imperialists 
who successfully resisted cession of the western claim for a further four 
years.51
By the late 1770’s, the Continental Congress had come to a virtual 
impasse over the issue of western lands.  Maryland, having no territorial 
claims in the West, refused to ratify the Articles of Confederation until 
her powerful southern neighbor agreed to surrender her western lands 
to the Union.52  Without Maryland, Congress lacked the unanimity re-
quired to empower the Articles and create the first truly national gov-
ernment.  So long as Virginia’s General Assembly remained under the 
sway of opponents of western cession, the Union’s future seemed in 
doubt.  Not until Jefferson had occupied the Governor’s chair for over 
a year did circumstances become more favorable to his vision of a Na-
tional Domain forged from Virginia’s western empire.  After New York’s 
cession of its western claims in March 1780, Maryland came under in-
creasing pressure to ratify the Articles and join in a common western 
policy.  Slowly, Maryland’s delegation grew more amenable to com-
   47 See Merrill Jensen, The Creation of the National Domain, 1781–1784, 26 MISS. VALLEY 
HIST. REV. 232 (1939). 
   48 See MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING 
THE CONFEDERATION, 1781–1789, at 353 (Northeastern University Press 1981) (1950). 
   49 See Thomas Jefferson, Second Draft, Before 13 June, 1776, in 1 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, 
supra note 18, at 352–53; see also 7 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 76–77, 79 n.12 (William 
T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1971) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS]. 
 50 See Thomas Jefferson, Draft of a Declaration of Rights, Prepared for the Virginia Con-
vention of August 1774, in 1 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 119; see Thomas Jef-
ferson, Refutation of the Argument that the Colonies Were Established at the Expense of the 
British Nation, in 1 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 283; see also NOTES ON 
VIRGINIA, supra note 16, at 110–18 (offering Jefferson’s recapitulation of these argu-
ments). 
    51 See 7 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 49, at 74 (ed. note). 
    52 See id. at 76–77 (ed. note). 
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promise.  Meanwhile, in the Old Dominion, ongoing military and fiscal 
crises were bringing influential leaders around to the Governor’s pro-
cession views.  With British troops moving northwards from the Caroli-
nas, and with more French aid contingent on the formation of a 
stronger national government, John Walker, Richard Henry Lee, Jo-
seph Jones, and, especially, George Mason, began to push aggressively 
for nationalisation of the western domain.  Mason, not generally an ar-
dent champion of stronger central government, shared Jefferson’s de-
sire to see the West opened to veterans and settlers.  This sense of ur-
gency flowed not just from Virginia’s precarious military situation, but 
from Mason’s opposition to the western claims of the Philadelphia-
based Indiana Company, whose financial backers enjoyed strong repre-
sentation in the Continental Congress.  Mason himself backed rival 
claims of the Virginia-based Ohio Company.53
Various factions in the Continental Congress, however, had long 
opposed Virginia’s title to the western lands, not out of healthy solici-
tude for equality in size and population among the states of the Union, 
but because they feared that Virginia would not uphold claims obtained 
from Indian nations by large-scale speculators on the eastern seaboard.  
Jefferson’s policy of nullifying private purchases of Indian lands—
epitomized in his 1776 constitutional proposal—stood to deprive Phila-
delphia and New York landjobbers of millions of acres and dollars.  
Thus, his republican vision of the West stood arrayed against the poli-
tics of finance and interest.  Moreover, these different visions of the 
West complicated the issue of transference of territorial title, even after 
the General Assembly had decided in principle to hand over the lands.  
If few members of Congress were conceptually opposed to Virginia’s 
western lands passing into Congressional control, many members re-
sisted Virginia’s efforts to insure that the West became a haven for set-
tlers rather than a boon to speculators.54  The conditions Mason at-
tached to the original cession of 1781 rendered that offer unacceptable 
to the majority in Congress.55  It was another two years before the Old 
Dominion and the Confederation Congress were able to consummate 
the transfer of title to the Old Northwest. 
 53 See MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION:  AN INTERPRETATION OF 
THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1774–1781 
(1970).  For Mason’s hostility to the Indiana and Vandalia Companies see id. at 217–
18; for Mason’s support of the Ohio Company, see id. at 205–08. 
 54 On the Virginia delegation's hostility to the speculator interest, see, for example, 
Letter from James Madison to Joseph Jones (Nov. 21, 1780), in 7 MADISON PAPERS, supra 
note 49, at 190–91, in which Madison heaps much sarcasm and derision on lobbyists 
representing Philadelphia speculator interests. 
    55 Jensen, supra note 47, at 332. 
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Shortly before Jefferson took his seat at the 1783 session of the 
Continental Congress, members began discussing organization of the 
West.  After a long period of wrangling among states, partisans, and 
“interested” members, Virginia submitted a second conditional ces-
sion of its vast western claims in June 1783.  Congress did not finally 
accept the Virginia Cession until March 1, 1784, but in the meantime, 
considerable urgency attached to laying an organizational framework 
in anticipation of final acceptance.56  Thus, on December 18, 1783, 
Jefferson, fortified by his well-earned reputation as a strong supporter 
of the National Domain, assumed chairmanship of the Congressional 
committee selected to draw up a plan for temporary government of 
the West.57  He completed a preliminary proposal shortly before ac-
ceptance of the Cession.58
Unlike George Washington and some other proponents of west-
ern organization, Jefferson was not pressed by fear of “banditti,” 
whom skeptics thought would surely overwhelm the West if vigorous 
government were not quickly installed.59  In the words of Julian Boyd,  
the orderly and progressive division of the whole of the existing 
and potential domain into new states to be incorporated into the 
Union on a basis of equality was too great an object to be has-
tened by the fear of squatters, the pressures of land companies, or 
even the claims of officers and soldiers.60   
So notwithstanding the sense of urgency animating many members in 
Congress, and his own passion to promote republican society and 
government, Jefferson approached organization of the West with the 
detached and scholarly air of an intellectual. 
Between December 1783 and mid-February 1784, he developed 
three successively more comprehensive schemes for western govern-
ment, moving beyond the “colony” Washington had proposed to the 
chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs, through plans for six 
states, to his final ideal of numerous territories.  Although the Com-
mittee on Western Land’s purpose had been limited to providing for 
temporary government, on March 1, 1784, Jefferson reported a pro-
posal describing a three-stage process to full and permanent state-
 56 See PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST 
ORDINANCE 1–20 (1987). 
 57 6 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 586 (ed. note). 
 58 Id. at 582–83. 
 59 See ONUF, supra note 57, at 1–20. 
 60 6 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 582–83 (ed. note). 
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hood in the Union.61  After a period of temporary self-government, 
constitutional statehood could be achieved when the population 
reached 20,000.  This crucial middle stage involved formation of so-
cial contracts, embodied in “Charters of Compact,” which would 
stand as “fundamental constitutions between the thirteen original 
states, and those newly described.”62  Full admission to the Confeder-
acy would occur when a new state’s population exceeded that of the 
least populous original state.63  If the idea of admitting new states into 
the Confederacy was widely accepted by this time, no previous legal 
provisions existed under the Articles, and it was Jefferson’s words that 
first enshrined this republican principle into national law.64
He also included a clause changing the majority required for 
major new Confederation laws from nine of the original to two-thirds 
of the existing states.65  He had no desire to give a small minority of 
states a blocking power, or to bind new states to the Confederation 
on less than equal terms.  His solicitude extended not only to rela-
tions between the federal states, nor even to the mechanics of the 
new state governments, but also to the very fabric of society in the 
new domain.  Jefferson’s objective was no less than to secure a repub-
lican future for the Union’s vast western reserve.66  This republican 
 61 Jensen, supra note 47, at 339–41; 6 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 586–
87 (ed. note). 
 62 6 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 587 (ed. note). 
 63 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 19, at 603. 
 64 Id. at 586–87 (ed. note). 
 65 Compare id. at 615, with ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (U.S. 1781), 
which required the consent of at least nine states for Congress to 
engage in a war, . . . grant letters of marque or reprisal in time of 
peace, . . . enter into treaties and alliances, . . . coin money, . . . regulate 
the value thereof, . . . ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for 
the defense and welfare of the United States, or any of them, . . . emit 
bills, . . . borrow money on the credit of the United States, . . . appro-
priate money, . . . agree upon the number of vessels of war, to be built 
or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, . . . [or] 
appoint a commander in chief of the army or navy . . . . 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XI (U.S. 1781).  Article XI required consent of nine 
states for admission of territories other than Canada, which was entitled to admission 
upon its ratification of the Articles.  All other questions except adjournment re-
quired a majority of the states, per Article IX. 
 66 On Jefferson’s republicanism, see generally LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN 
PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY (1978); DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE 
REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA (1980); Robert E. Shalhope, 
Thomas Jefferson’s Republicanism and Antebellum Southern Thought, 42 J. OF S. HIST. 529 
(1976).  Joyce Appleby famously argues that scholars like Banning and McCoy over-
state Jefferson’s classical republican sensibilities, and indeed that the doyens of re-
publican history, Bernard Bailyn, J.G.A. Pocock, and Gordon Wood (before GORDON 
WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: HOW A REVOLUTION 
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vision held no place for un-republican law, custom, or practice, 
whether held over from the colonial period, or originating with in-
terested parties of the day.  And crucially, in this thoroughly republi-
can world, there was no place for slavery.  In fact, a detailed analysis 
of the proposed Ordinance of 1784 reveals the most systematic pre-
scription for construction of a republican state appearing in any offi-
cial state paper of Jefferson’s creation.  This formula was utterly in-
imical to the expansion of American slavery, and in this respect, 
Jefferson’s plan for the West far outstripped the model for a republi-
canized Virginia he had crafted while serving on the Committee of 
Revision.67
Jefferson submitted two draft proposals concerning the western 
lands to Congress, the Report of the Committee [on Government of the 
Western Territory] of March 1, and the Revised Report of March 22, 
1784.  Both are written entirely in his hand, and no commentator 
then or since expressed doubt that they represented Jefferson’s own 
vision of western development.68  After delineating orderly bounda-
TRANSFORMED A MONARCHICAL SOCIETY INTO A DEMOCRATIC ONE UNLIKE ANY THAT HAD 
EVER EXISTED (1992) [hereinafter WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION]), overstate the role of republican thought in the revolutionary and 
early national experience, which, in Appleby’s eyes, was always more liberal than re-
publicans acknowledged.  See JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: 
THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790S (1984) [hereinafter APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND 
NEW SOCIAL ORDER]; JOYCE APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORICAL 
IMAGINATION (1992) [hereinafter APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM] (respond-
ing to classic republican histories such as BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS 
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: 
FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); 
and GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1969) 
[hereinafter WOOD, CREATION OF AMERICAN REPUBLIC]).  John Murrin, Professor 
Emeritus at Princeton and long a leading historian of American political thought, is 
at work on a comprehensive and reflective historiography of the intellectual and 
ideological dimensions of the American Revolution, placing the once heated and 
now subsided liberal/republican dispute in broader perspective.   My own sense after 
twenty years of reflection is that Jefferson’s Whig-republican commitments cannot be 
overestimated, while his liberal capitalist sensibilities have been much overstated. 
 67 On Jefferson’s work on the Committee of Revision, and the Committee’s un-
reported gradual abolition plan, see supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.   Sev-
eral respected authorities would disagree with my characterization of the 1784 plan 
as “utterly inimical to the expansion of slavery.”  See, e.g., FINKLEMAN, SLAVERY AND THE 
FOUNDERS, supra note 7, at 42 (arguing that delaying emancipation until 1800 would 
allow slavery to gain a foothold and resist its scheduled termination).  I offer a 
counterargument based on the deterrence of slaveholder in-migration.  See infra 
notes 178–83 and accompanying text.  William Wiecek tends towards Finkelman’s 
view, see WIECEK, ANTI-SLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 35, at 60, and Duncan 
MacLeod tends toward mine, see MACLEOD, supra note 31, at 47–49. 
 68 The Committee consisted of three members: David Howell of Rhode Island, 
Jeremiah Townley Chase of Maryland, and Jefferson, who served as chairman.  The 
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ries for the new western states, and describing the mechanics of tran-
sition to full statehood, the Revised Report follows the Report of March 1 
in stipulating five fundamental provisions binding both the United 
States and the new states to a republican future.  The report 
provided that both the temporary and permanent governments 
be established on these principles as their basis. 
 1. That they shall for ever remain a part of this confederacy of 
the United states of America. 
 2. That in their persons, property and territory they shall be sub-
ject to the government of the United states in Congress assem-
bled, and to the Articles of confederation in all those cases in 
which the original shall be so subject. 
 3. That they shall be subject to pay a part of the federal debts 
contracted or to be contracted, to be apportioned on them by 
Congress, according to the same common rule and measure, by 
which apportionments thereof shall be made on the other states. 
 4. That their respective governments shall be in republican 
forms, and shall admit no person to a citizen who holds any he-
reditary title. 
 5.  That after the year 1800. of the Christian era, there shall be 
neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the said states, 
otherwise than in punishment of crimes whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted to have been personally guilty.69   
The preceding articles, Jefferson continued,  
shall be formed into a charter of compact . . . and shall stand as 
fundamental constitutions between the thirteen original states 
and each of the several states now newly described, unalterable 
but by the joint consent of the Unites states in Congress assem-
bled, and of the particular state [concerned].70   
 
committee appears to have been at least nominally a subcommittee of the Commit-
tee on Indian Affairs, also chaired by Jefferson.  Howell, a future law professor at 
Brown and then United States district judge, became an enthusiastic supporter of 
Jefferson on the committee.  See 6 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 584–85 (ed. 
note).  All the subcommittee’s paper work, including the interlineations, are in Jef-
ferson’s hand.  In the public eye, Jefferson has always been considered the author of 
Ordinance, and it was Jefferson who bore the brunt of jokes concerning the names 
chosen (in all but two cases later rejected by Congress) for the new states:  Washing-
ton, Saratoga, Pelisipia, Polypotamia, Illinoia, Metropotamia, Assenisippia, 
Cherronesus, and Michigania.   These names figure in Jefferson’s papers dating from 
before the committee’s formation.   Id. at 584–600 (ed. note). 
 69 REVISED REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 25, at 608–09.  This language is 
very nearly the same as the REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 19, at 603–04. 
 70 REVISED REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 25, at 609. 
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In this Charter of Compact between the East and West, the termina-
tion of slavery takes a prominent and central position.  Only perpet-
ual union, authority of the Articles, responsibility for the federal debt, 
republican government, and proscription of aristocratic title merit 
mention alongside the mandated end of western slavery.  Hence, 
eradication of slavery assumes an even higher status here than in Jef-
ferson’s proposed Virginia Constitution of 1782–1783, and a far more 
exalted place than it had in the Report of the Revisors, where eman-
cipation was “held back” to be proposed only when the time for free-
dom had ripened in the public mind.71
In the proposed fundamental law for the Old Dominion, termi-
nation of slavery was constructed as a limit against legislative author-
ity.  There, Jefferson wrote that “the general assembly . . . shall not 
have the power to permit the continuance of slavery beyond the gen-
eration which shall be living on the thirty-first of December one thou-
sand eight hundred.”72  That pronouncement resonated with Jeffer-
son’s failed argument in Howell v. Netherland73 and with the Somerset 
decision of 1772,74 implying that slavery had no authority on its own, 
but instead required the positive and unnatural imposition of special 
legislation for its continuance.  While a constitutional limitation of 
legislative power surely amounts to fundamental law, emancipation in 
the proposed Constitution of 1783 remained one of many clauses in a 
complex document, a document that would have established many 
types of authority and many rights against authority.  The five princi-
ples proposed in the Ordinance of 1784, conversely, amount to a su-
preme distillation of higher-law constitutionality.  They formed a 
Charter of Compact from which state constitutions must derive, but 
could not dissent.  Finally, the charter of compact was perpetual,75 
though Jefferson thought constitutions could be altered by each ris-
ing generation, every nineteen years by his reckoning.76  To be sure, 
 71 Respecting ending slavery in Virginia, an established and more densely popu-
lated slave society, Jefferson repeatedly expressed concern lest emancipation be car-
ried into effect precipitously, before the public mind had “ripened” to the idea.   
Perhaps his most thorough and revealing exposition of this view is set out in Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Coles (Aug. 25, 1814), in 11 WORKS OF JEFFERSON, 
supra note 13, at 416.  
 72 JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA, supra note 16, app. at 214. 
 73 See supra note 14. 
 74 See supra note 15. 
 75 “[T]hey shall for ever remain a part of this confederacy of the United States of 
America.”  REVISED REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 25, at 608. 
 76 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 
PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 392–97; HERBERT E. SLOAN, PRINCIPLE AND 
INTEREST: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE PROBLEM OF DEBT 80–81 (2001).  Jefferson’s 
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Jefferson used the term unalterable only in a qualified manner.  But 
alteration of any provision in the Charter of Compact did require 
joint consent of two-thirds of the existing states and the state propos-
ing alteration, which, in the case of the slavery prohibition, would 
have amounted to a very formidable barrier to repeal.  Under the sys-
tem Jefferson proposed in 1784, to take one example, there would 
have been little hope of securing sufficient votes to allow Kentucky to 
convert to a slave state after its entry in 1792 (bearing in mind that 
Jefferson’s plan applied to all territory ceded and to be ceded, not 
just to the territory northwest of the Ohio).77  Before the Federal 
Constitution of 1788, with its demanding requirements for amend-
ment, Jefferson envisioned the summoning of a new convention as 
the standard, and perhaps not infrequent, avenue to alteration of 
state and federal constitutions.78  According to this understanding, 
Jefferson’s Ordinance of 1784 provided a substantial added sense of 
permanence to the anti-slavery clause, a sense of entrenchment tran-
scending that already inherent in state constitutions. 
The termination provision in the Territorial Governance Act 
would not only have possessed more fundamental authority than the 
emancipation clause in his proposed constitution for Virginia, it 
would also have been more radical in its operation.  The emancipa-
tion clause freed children born to slaves after 1800;79 the termination 
provision ended all slavery after 1800.  Moreover, the Ordinance of 
1784 applied to “territory ceded or to be ceded by Individual states to 
calculation is based on a review of French demographic data suggesting half the 
adults living at any particular time would be deceased nineteen years thereafter.  Id. 
at 277 n.7. 
 77 Kentucky entered the Union with a narrowly-won slave constitution in 1792 as 
the fifteenth state.  See THOMAS P. ABERNATHY, THE SOUTH IN THE NEW NATION 70–72 
(1961).  Had the 1784 proviso gone into operation, Kentucky would have had to en-
ter as a free state, and then obtain the consent of ten of the other fourteen states to 
permit slavery and convert to slave status.  Any five states—say New Hampshire, Mas-
sachusetts, Vermont, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania—could have vetoed the switch.  
Whether Jefferson’s proviso would have prevented Missouri’s entry as a slave state is a 
more complex question.  By its own terms, the 1784 Ordinance (like the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787) would not have applied to the Louisiana Purchase and subse-
quent territorial acquisitions, since these did not involve cessions by any of the fed-
eral states, but grants by foreign powers.  While the anti-slavery clause would not have 
applied directly in Missouri, one might still wonder whether Missourians would have 
contemplated slavery quite so seriously if Kentucky and Tennessee had entered as 
free states under Jefferson’s clause, rendering the empire of liberty that much 
grander, and the empire of slavery that much less expansive in the eyes of western 
expansionists. 
 78 See RICHARD K. MATTHEWS, THE RADICAL POLITICS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: A 
REVISIONIST VIEW 22 (1984); MAYER, supra note 30, at 299–302. 
 79 Jefferson, Draught Constitution, supra note 16, app. at 209, 214. 
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the United states”80—as proposed  it would have ended slavery not 
only in the Virginia cession of the Old Northwest, but also in the 
Carolina and Georgia cessions when those materialized, that is, in the 
lands that became the cotton belt of the Old Southwest. 
Jefferson’s thoroughgoing effort to write slavery out of the re-
publican West in 1784 contrasts sharply with the Revisors’ reluctant 
decision to retain slavery in Virginia in 1778, pending submission of 
the gradual emancipation bill that was never put forward.  The Report 
of the Revisors81 addressed republican civics in an existing society, a so-
ciety whose manners (Jefferson readily admitted) were fatally flawed 
by human bondage.  Part common-law restatement, part statutory 
codification, the Revisors’ work aimed to preserve liberties estab-
lished by long standing custom, purge ancient freedoms of corrupt-
ing encroachments, and strip away unwieldy and oppressive vestiges 
of feudalism.  In the end, however, the Report of the Revisors was less a 
blueprint for an ideal future than a codification of ordered liberty as 
it existed in Virginia practice.82  While the Revisors recognized that 
slavery constituted an egregious affront to liberty, they lacked the 
mandate and the means to legislate it out of existence.  Exist it did, 
and it was deeply ingrained.  Extrication from slavery in Virginia was 
desirable, but it would be a prickly undertaking.83
The West told a different story.  Here was a brave new world, a 
fresh canvas for Jefferson’s portrait of an ideal society.84  It offered 
the ultimate forum for republican and enlightened creation, for 
state-building without corruption, without the dead hand of slavery 
inherited from the colonial past.  The cession and the appointment 
 80 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 19, at 603–07. 
 81 See Committee of Revisors at Fredricksburg, Revisal of the Laws 1776–1786 
(1777), reprinted in 2 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 305–657. 
 82 See DUMBAULD, supra note 30, at 132–43; MAYER, supra note 30, at 66–69. 
 83 See MACLEOD, supra note 31, at 34, 75–76 (1974); see generally Merkel, supra note 
32. 
 84 This image is informed in part by the opening chapters of LEO MARX, MACHINE 
IN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PASTORAL IDEAL IN AMERICA (1965).  But see 
ONUF, supra note 45, at 33–46, which makes the point that Jefferson knew as well as 
anyone the intricacies of relations with the various native tribes who actually inhab-
ited the West and their European allies.  Id.  In Onuf’s reading, Jefferson viewed the 
machinations of European powers as a serious threat to the republican West, but as-
sumed that without European intervention Indian peoples would realize that their 
interest lay in peaceful integration into the white American nation and in adoption 
of settled agricultural lifestyles.  Id. at 31.  But see MCCOY, supra note 67, passim (ex-
plaining the importance of western expansion to the republican vision of Jefferson 
and Madison for preserving a society free of European corruption).  On the allure of 
the far west, see generally DONALD JACKSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE STONY 
MOUNTAINS: EXPLORING THE WEST FROM MONTICELLO (1981). 
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of the Committee on Western Lands gave Jefferson authority to play 
the new Lycergus.  Granted, slavery did exist on a small scale in the 
Northwest at the time of the Virginia cession.  French-speaking in-
habitants had held black slaves for several generations north of the 
Ohio; south of the Ohio slavery was more widely practiced by both 
whites and Indians.85  But it was not then ingrained there as in Vir-
ginia.  The West was not a slave society, and in 1784, Jefferson did not 
intend to let it become one.  Slavery, as it existed in the National 
Domain, could be cast off without any fear of unbearable social tur-
moil.86
Notwithstanding Jefferson’s awareness of slavery’s presence in 
the West, the Land Act’s ill-fated anti-slavery clause makes no men-
tion of deportation or colonization to follow termination.  Like the 
proposed Virginia constitution of the previous year, it elevates the 
end of slavery, but not black deportation, to higher-law status.  Pre-
sumably, colonization would have been a local option left to the dis-
cretion of legislatures in the new states.  In part, this reflects Jeffer-
son’s unwillingness to have Congress dictate policy on an issue of this 
level to the new sovereign states.  Beyond the five fundamental stipu-
lations of republicanism—themselves indispensable to the creation of 
sound political societies within the Confederation—sovereignty in the 
western states would be absolute.87  However, the omission of a colo-
 85 See WIECEK, supra note 35, at 108–09 (citing MORTON M. ROSENBERG & DENNIS V. 
MCCLURG, THE POLITICS OF PRO-SLAVERY SENTIMENT IN INDIANA 1816–61, at 1–10 
(1968)); see also JOHN D. BARNHART, VALLEY OF DEMOCRACY: THE FRONTIER VERSUS THE 
PLANTATION IN THE OHIO VALLEY 1775–1818, at 159–60 (1953). 
 86 Jefferson was famously troubled respecting the prospects for post-
emancipation co-existence in Virginia.  In Notes on Virginia he wrote, 
Why not retain and incorporate the blacks into the state, and thus save 
the expence of supplying, by importation of white settlers, the vacan-
cies they will leave?  Deep rooted prejudices entertained by the whites; 
ten thousand recollections, by the blacks, of the injuries they have sus-
tained; new provocations; the real distinctions which nature has made; 
and many other circumstances, will divide us into parties, and produce 
convulsions which will probably never end but in the extermination of 
the one or the other race. 
JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA, supra note 16, at 138.  But at other times during the 
1780s, Jefferson contemplated more hopeful prospects for a multi-racial post-
emancipation Virginia.  See generally Merkel, supra note 32 (arguing that Jefferson did 
not become irrevocably committed to colonization as a condition for emancipation 
until the Haitian Revolution).  Cf. Ashli Lee White, A Flood of Impure Lava: Saint 
Dominguan refugees in the United States, 1791–1820 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with author) (exploring the impact of ac-
counts of Haitian violence on political sensibilities in the United States). 
 87 For a thoughtful analysis of this problem, see ONUF, supra note 56, at 43–49, 
and ONUF, supra note 21, at 41–46.  The issue of whether federal sovereignty in the 
pre-statehood territories was absolute became contested during the ante-bellum pe-
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nization proviso from the charter of Compact may reflect more than 
simply respect for localism and states rights. 
In the section on establishment of temporary government, Jef-
ferson wrote “[t]hat the settlers within any of the said states shall, ei-
ther on their own petition, or on the order of Congress, receive au-
thority from them, with appointments of time and place for their free 
males of full age to meet together for the purpose of establishing a 
temporary government.”88  Thus Jefferson chose the more inclusive 
locution “free males of full age” over the racially restrictive “free 
white males” to outline the participatory process for establishing de-
mocratic governance in the West.  In a state paper of constitutional 
import, Jefferson chose his words with especial deliberation.89  He did 
not, for instance, write free persons or even the then-more gender-
ambiguous free men, however distant the prospect of female suffrage 
may have been from the political horizons of the rising West.  I am 
not aware whether Jefferson knew that some women were voting in 
New Jersey in 1780s, or whether he was acquainted with any of New 
Jersey’s female voters.90  Much later in life, Jefferson met the early suf-
fragette, Frances Wright, who visited Monticello with LaFayette in 
1824,91 but it seems a safe bet that Jefferson must have entertained, at 
least hypothetically, the eventuality of female suffrage, given that he 
chose his words precisely so as to exclude it.  He was, after all, a fa-
mously meticulous legislative draftsman, and, as historians in our 
riod.  The Dred Scott Court famously held that the powers of the United States were 
limited in the territories, and that claim appeared novel and bold until the time of 
the controversies over the Mexican cession and the Kansas/Nebraska Act.  Scott v. 
Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 395–96 (1857).  I am not aware that anyone asserted 
a similar argument under the Confederation government.  See FEHRENBACHER, supra 
note 37, at 365–88 (discussing Justice Taney’s approach to territorial questions con-
cerning slavery); ONUF, supra note 21, at 41–46 (explaining the territorial situation 
under the Articles of Confederation); WIECEK, supra note 35, at 114–15 (regarding 
the pre-Dred Scott understanding of the territories). 
 88 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 19, at 603. 
 89 See generally ANDREW BERNSTEIN, THE INNER JEFFERSON: PORTRAIT OF A GRIEVING 
OPTIMIST (1995); JAY FLIEGELMAN, DECLARING INDEPENDENCE: JEFFERSON, NATURAL 
LANGUAGE & THE CULTURE OF PERFORMANCE (1993) (analyzing Jefferson’s meticulous, 
indeed obsessive, character as a writer and draftsman). 
 90 For a discussion of female voting in New Jersey, first, pursuant to gender-
neutral language in the state constitution of 1776, and then pursuant to a 1790 stat-
ute referring to voters as “he or she,” see MARY BETH NORTON, LIBERTY’S DAUGHTERS, 
THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN WOMEN, 1750–1800, at 191–93 (Cornell 
Univ. Press 1996) (1980).  The aforementioned practice ended following a referen-
dum in 1807. 
 91 He met Frances Wright in 1824, two years before his death.  He was by that 
time somewhat set in his ways.  On Wright’s Monticello visit, and for a speculative 
account of Jefferson’s reaction, see BRODIE, supra note 10, at 460–64. 
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time have pointed out, it was “careless” or over-broad constitutional 
drafting that was “blamed” for the early assertion of female entitle-
ment to vote in New Jersey.92
Whether or not Jefferson knew women voters, he personally 
knew many free black men and generally knew of hundreds more.93  
By 1784, he must have known that most state constitutions did not 
exclude free black men from voting,94 and that free blacks were vot-
ing to a considerable extent in Maryland, North Carolina, New Jersey, 
New York, and Pennsylvania.95  Indeed, the observant Jefferson had 
by now resided (albeit fairly briefly) in two of the states where blacks 
were voting regularly (Pennsylvania and Maryland), and visited a 
third (New Jersey), all during the autumn election cycles.96  So if Jef-
ferson went to the length of specifying that voters in the West should 
be male, when the exclusivity of the male franchise was—at least out-
side of New Jersey—taken for granted, why did he not also specify 
that they should be white, when free black men were voting in at least 
five states?  The fifth proviso to the Charter of Compact dictated that 
from 1800 there would be significant numbers of free blacks in the 
ceded territories, in fact that all blacks in the ceded territories would 
be free.97  Would these men then number amongst the free males of full 
age, and participate in the formation of governments? 
Jefferson did not insist that they must, or even that they should, 
but his choice of words suggests an interesting ambivalence.  If he in-
 92 NORTON, supra note 90, at 192–93. 
 93 See generally Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Bancroft (Jan. 26, 1789), 
in 14 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 492 (discussing Jefferson’s awareness of 
Virginia’s growing free black community). 
 94 While John Adams’s definitive comparative study of state constitutions, 
A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States, did not appear until 
three years later in 1787, it is unthinkable that Jefferson, who was so fascinated by 
comparative constitutionalism, had not consulted the texts of the existing state con-
stitutions in 1783 when he prepared his Draft Constitution for Virginia.  See generally 
WOOD, CREATION OF AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 66, at 127–28 (1969) (explaining 
Jefferson’s joining in the national intellectual obsession with state constitution-
making during the revolutionary period). 
 95 For a discussion of free black suffrage during the revolutionary period, see 
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF 
AFRICAN AMERICANS 171 (8th ed. 2004).  In New Jersey, some black women voted as 
well.  See NORTON, supra note 92, at 191–93.  In most states where they had voted, free 
blacks were disenfranchised in the early nineteenth century.  See IRA BERLIN, SLAVES 
WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 91 (1974); LEON 
LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790–1860, at 74–93 
(1961). 
 96 See MALONE, supra note 20, at 399–423 (describing Jefferson’s journeys through 
the mid-Atlantic region from autumn 1782 to spring 1784). 
 97 See supra note 71. 
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tended only that his constitutional language should leave the deci-
sion (which he might in turn have expected to be an unthinking 
choice for exclusion) to local legislatures, the fact that he did not feel 
compelled to forestall the eventuality of participation of small num-
bers of blacks in American political society suggests that he could 
contemplate that very possibility—and contemplate it without horror 
and hysterics.98  Of course the West was not plantation Virginia.  
These were frontier societies with small black populations.  This re-
moteness and sparseness of black population could create sufficient 
symbolic distance to make a permanent black role—and even black 
citizenship—in trans-Allegheny society less alarming to Jefferson than 
it appeared in the Tidewater or Piedmont. 
Back home in Virginia, Jefferson was not always comfortable with 
the prospect of a multi-racial post-emancipation society.  In the Notes 
on Virginia, he urged that the vast majority of former slaves from the 
plantations be colonized outside the state after emancipation.99  
However, the presence of small numbers of African individuals after 
slavery did not necessarily alarm him even in the East,100 and Jeffer-
son’s subsequent dealings with skilled African American workers 
evinces a level of ease with the black artisan classes of Philadelphia 
and Virginia. This is consistent with his visions of a free Monticello, 
where Jupiter still worked as coachman and valet, and Isaac still oper-
ated the nail factory.101  The truth may be more striking still.  While 
Jefferson frequently discussed the post-slavery shape of agricultural 
production in Virginia,102 it is not at all clear that he had the capacity 
to imagine Monticello itself without Isaac, Jupiter, and the other 
 98 Contra ONUF, supra note 46, at 147–88 & passim (arguing that Jefferson could 
not be reconciled to post-emancipation coexistence under any circumstances).  
Onuf’s is perhaps the prevailing view among modern authorities.  I disagree.  In my 
thesis, Race, Liberty and Law, I concede that Jefferson expressed skepticism respecting 
post-emancipation coexistence on several occasions during the 1780s, but point out 
that he also openly engaged and accommodated prospects of a multi-racial post-
slavery Virginia at other times during the years immediately following independence.  
See generally Merkel, supra note 32.  I argue that Jefferson’s hostility towards emanci-
pation without colonization existed only in response to the extreme violence of the 
Haitian Revolution, and the extermination and expulsion of the former French col-
ony’s white population.  Id. 
 99 JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA, supra note 16, at 137–38, 143. 
 100 Jefferson outlined plans to free his own slaves and commingle them with Ger-
man settlers on his estates.  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Bancroft 
(Jan. 26, 1789), in 14 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 492 (writing the letter in 
1789 but mistakenly attributing the letter to 1788). 
 101 See Merkel, supra note 32. 
 102 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Bancroft (Jan. 26, 1789), in 
14 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 492–93. 
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skilled black workers and familiar domestics on whom he always de-
pended.103  When he contemplated Virginia without slavery, Jefferson 
readily pictured his own estates cultivated by free laborers, but Jeffer-
son’s productive fields were not directly visible from his home.  As far 
as I know, he never described how Monticello itself would look with-
out African American residents and workers, whether free or en-
slaved.104
Monticello, though, was not the West, and for present purposes, 
my principal point is that Jefferson’s vision of the west was free and 
overwhelmingly white, but not inherently exclusively European.  In 
contemplating the western future, Jefferson assumed Indians, and 
perhaps in due course Latin Americans, would ultimately be ab-
sorbed through racial mixture into the Anglo-American people.105  In 
the interim, Indians would remain distinct peoples, becoming, Jeffer-
son assumed, more and more Anglo-American in their ways of life.106  
In theory, but not in practice, Jefferson disdained racial mixture of 
whites and blacks.107  Whites and blacks, he devoutly hoped (or so he 
said), would not interbreed.108  Still, his constitutional and legislative 
usage in the 1780s is entirely consistent with continued cohabitation 
of whites and small numbers of blacks in the west, who, not inter-
breeding, would necessarily remain separate people; a majority and 
small minority, being distinct and adjacent.  In the East, meanwhile, 
Jefferson urged colonization of the majority of persons to be freed 
when emancipation eventually came.109  His was still an understand-
ing of colonization as primarily an anti-slavery measure, as a co-
 103 The codependence hypothesis is famous in the philosophy of slavery, and is 
perhaps most closely associated with Hegel and with Orlando Patterson.  See DAVID 
BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY DURING THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770–1823, at 
558–64 (1975) (writing on Hegel and the epistemology of slavery); ORLANDO 
PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY passim (1982).  Of 
course, the realization goes back to classical times, as the old Latin paradigm drill on 
the ablative absolute suggests (“His slave having died, Cicero was very sad.”).  Perhaps 
recalling his own childhood Latin lessons, Jefferson wept bitterly when Jupiter died 
in 1800, after more than forty-five years of uncompensated service dating back to Jef-
ferson’s school days.  BRODIE, supra note 10, at 376.  For a cogent recent exploration 
of Jefferson’s multilayered dependence on Monticello’s enslaved population, see Lu-
cia Stanton, Those Who Labor for My Happiness: Thomas Jefferson and His Slaves, in 
JEFFERSON LEGACIES 147, 147–80 (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993). 
 104 See, e.g., the highly speculative but perceptive analysis of Fawn Brodie in 
BRODIE, supra note 10, at 455–70, which pictured the aged Jefferson as psychologi-
cally and financially incapable of extricating himself from slavery. 
 105 See ONUF, supra note 45, at 50–52. 
 106 Id. at 51. 
 107 See JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA, supra note 16, at 138. 
 108 See id. at 143. 
 109 Id. 
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requisite of emancipation, required to ensure peace and stability af-
ter the bonds of slavery had been loosed, not a means to remove 
small numbers of free blacks from an upper South committed to con-
tinued slaveholding.110  By the 1830s, colonization may have been 
widely construed among Southerners as a means to buttress slavery by 
purging a restless element from society—and Jefferson’s own argu-
ments for deportation of the Gabriel conspirators partly prefigured 
this construction as early as 1800—but in the 1780s, the constitution-
alism behind the colonization Jefferson favored focused squarely on 
freedom.111  And in the 1780s, Jefferson’s colonizationist imperative 
was, unlike the principle of western freedom, neither ironclad nor 
absolute, his occasional contrary protestations notwithstanding.112
III. RESTORING THE ANTI-SLAVERY IMAGE OF THE FAILED CLAUSE 
The fifth plank of Jefferson’s Charter of Compact was not al-
lowed to stand.  It appears in both the Report of March 1 and the Re-
vised Report of March 22, but not in the Ordinance of 1784 as finally 
adopted by Congress on April 23.113  The anti-slavery clause wanted 
support from only one additional state for passage; New Jersey (al-
though then still quite a slave state)114 was not seated, and even the 
single vote of a further Virginia or North Carolina delegate would 
have tipped either of those states in favor of enactment.  The impor-
tance of this unsuccessful effort to abolish and exclude slavery from 
the west transcends the question of Jefferson’s views on black eligibil-
ity for American citizenship.  Among the issues raised by the anti-
 110 See id. at 138. 
 111 For a discussion of the ideological transformation within the colonization 
movement, see generally ERIC BURIN, SLAVERY AND THE PECULIAR SOLUTION: A HISTORY 
OF THE AMERICAN COLONIZATION SOCIETY (2005). 
 112 In Jefferson’s Empire, Onuf relies on JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA, supra note 
16, to make the argument that Jefferson was always opposed to coexistence.  ONUF, 
supra note 45, at 147–88.  I largely agree with Onuf’s reading of the Notes, but in the 
decade after Jefferson completed his book, he made numerous statements inconsis-
tent with an ironclad commitment to removal.  See Merkel, supra note 84, at 265–320. 
 113 Cf. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 19, at 604; REVISED REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE, supra note 25, at 608; ORDINANCE OF 1784, supra note 22, at 613–15. 
 114 The census of 1790 shows that 11,423 slaves lived in New Jersey; 7.7% of the 
state’s population was black, and 80.5% of the black population was enslaved.   New 
Jersey did not pass a gradual emancipation law until 1804.  See DAVIS, supra note 103, 
at 31.  Eighteen slaves are still shown residing in New Jersey in the census of 1860.  
For census data on New Jersey in 1790, see SCHEDULE OF THE WHOLE NUMBER OF 
PERSONS WITHIN THE SEVERAL DISTRICTS OF THE UNITED STATES 40–43 (1790), available 
at www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1791a-01.pdf.  For census data 
concerning 1860, see J.G. RANDALL & DAVID HERBERT DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 5 (2d ed. 1969).  
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slavery clause in the Ordinance of 1784 are the degree of importance 
Jefferson attached to that provision, the effects it may have had on 
the Southwest if it had gone into operation, and the way in which it 
compares to Article VI of the Ordinance of 1787. 
The progressive era view that Jefferson’s Ordinance for Territorial 
Government of 1784 was rather more republican, and the Northwest Or-
dinance of 1787 more reactionary,115 and a corollary notion that the 
anti-slavery plank of 1784 surpassed Article VI of 1787 in its freedom-
favoring propensities, have suffered fierce attacks in more recent 
decades by scholars including Robert Berkhoffer, Peter Onuf, and 
Paul Finkelman.116  In particular, Berkhoffer has portrayed the North-
west Ordinance as a progressive improvement on the Land Act of 1784, 
Finkelman has sharply criticized notions that the Ordinance of 1784 
reflected any sincere and committed anti-slavery sentiments on the 
part of Jefferson,117 and both Finkelman and Onuf have suggested 
that even if the anti-slavery clause of 1784 had taken effect, it would 
have had little influence in stemming the spread of bondage into the 
Southwest.118
But it is Professor Finkelman who has been by far the most pro-
lific and persistent among the critical revisionists.  He places particu-
 115 See, e.g., MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
DURING THE CONFEDERATION, 1781–1789 (1950): 
     It is too often said, and believed, that the Northwest Ordinance of 
1787, which repealed the Ordinance of 1784, provided for democracy 
in the territories of the United States.  The reverse is actually true.  Jef-
ferson’s Ordinance provided for democratic self-government of west-
ern territories, and for that reason it was abolished in 1787 by the land 
speculators and their supporters who wanted congressional control of 
the West so that their interests could be protected from actions of the 
inhabitants. 
Id. at 354. 
 116 See Robert F. Berkhoffer, Jr., Jefferson, the Ordinance of 1784, and the American 
Territorial System, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 231, 260 (1972); Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery, 
supra note 1, at 181–221; Finkelman, Northwest Ordinance, supra note 29, at 353–59 
(1986); Onuf, supra note 56, at 110–13.  The pro-Jefferson view of the progressive 
historians is set out in JENSEN, supra note 115, at 352–59; MERRILL D. PETERSON, 
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION: A BIOGRAPHY 279–86 (1970); and FRANCIS S. 
PHILBRICK, THE RISE OF THE WEST, 1754–1830, at 120–33 (1965).  Roughly speaking, 
progressive historians did their graduate work under supervisors who did their 
graduate work in the progressive era prior to World War I.  Progressives stressed ma-
terial over ideological determination in American history, and rejected the “consen-
sus school’s” counter-arguments that there had never been class struggle in the 
United States.  The progressives tended to celebrate an agrarian past, and in so doing 
many of them underplayed the role of slaveholding in Jefferson and Jackson’s Democ-
ratic Party. 
 117 Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery, supra note 1, at 198–200. 
 118 Id. at 198; Onuf, supra note 56, at 110–11. 
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lar emphasis on the argument that Jefferson laid little stock in the 
slavery termination clause of 1784.  Finkelman’s reasoning here relies 
not so much on interpretation of evidence relating to the Ordinance of 
1784, but on a general belief that Jefferson was far more committed 
to slavery than to anti-slavery.  For Finkelman, white property rights 
simply meant more to Jefferson than to black claims to liberty. 
The American revolutionaries were trapped in an ideology of pri-
vate property that made it almost impossible for them collectively 
to give up their own pursuit of happiness for the liberty of others.  
In the Ordinance the ideals of liberty came into conflict with the 
selfish happiness of the ruling race.  Thus, the Congress could 
easily declare there would be no slavery in the Northwest Terri-
tory.  It was quite another matter to eliminate the institution 
there.119
To be “trapped in an ideology of private property”—and even to 
rate the private pursuit of personal wealth as the highest public 
ideal—seems, at first blush, a plausible way for human beings to at-
tempt to organize and understand their lives.120  After all, eminent 
historians such as Joyce Appleby and Gordon Wood of 1992 (but not 
Gordon Wood of 1969) maintain that the American revolutionaries 
did this generally, not simply with respect to slavery.121  And in recent 
decades, the Chicago School of Economics, and its near cousin the 
Law and Economics mode of jurisprudence, have insisted that we 
should orient our public policy along these very same principles and 
that it would be unnatural not to do so.122  Notwithstanding this ar-
gument’s wide appeal in our own time, there are cogent contextual 
reasons for doubting that Jefferson actually understood policy ques-
tions principally in terms of an irresolvable clash between rival abso-
lute interests in private property.  Specifically, the conceptions of 
property with which eighteenth-century Anglo-Virginian country gen-
tlemen and Whig lawyers were most intimately familiar cannot readily 
be employed in the manner Finkelman suggests they were (i.e., as ab-
 119 See generally Finkelman, Northwest Ordinance, supra note 29. 
 120 Id. 
 121 See generally APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM, supra note 66; APPLEBY, 
CAPITALISM AND NEW SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 66; WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 66.  Contra WOOD, CREATION OF AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC, supra note 66. 
 122 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); R. H. Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, 
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 1165 (1967). 
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solute epistemological barriers protecting a master’s uncompromis-
able assertion of ownership against a slave’s moral claim to freedom). 
As an old Whig and a country lawyer, Thomas Jefferson’s arche-
typal image of property was not a complete and uncontested owner-
ship claim to a legally protected interest (or thing, or slave) that no 
one but the possessor could control and that the possessor could ab-
solutely control.  Rather, his focus was the English system of estates in 
land—bundles of conflicting, circumscribed, limited, multivalent in-
terests, still rooted in corporate feudalism, and not necessarily at-
tuned to the dictates of liberal capitalism that were then quickly per-
meating the law of contract.123  The interests in real property that 
formed the dominant trope of aristocratic, genteel, and yeomanly self 
image in Jane Austen’s England and in Rhys Isaac’s Virginia were legally 
defined by a complex maelstrom of doctrines extending to fee tail, joint 
tenancies, estates pur autre vie, non-possessory rights and limitations of 
others’ rights such as easements and servitudes (each with its negative 
counterpart, each enforceable by instrument or operation of law), and 
covenants that ran with the land.124  Alienation was conditioned by a 
host of abstruse doctrines such as the Rule Against Perpetuities, the 
Rule in Shelley’s Case, and the Doctrine of Worthier Title.125  These 
 123 See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1780–1860 (1977). 
 124 Conflicted interests in landed estates and the status attendant thereto inspired 
a whole genre of “inheritance novels,” including Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa, Fran-
ces Burney’s Evelina, and Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice.  See SAMUEL RICHARDSON, 
CLARISSA, OR, THE HISTORY OF A YOUNG LADY (Angus Ross ed., Penguin Books 1986) 
(1748); FRANCES BURNEY, EVELINA (Edward A. Bloom ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) 
(1778); JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE (Wordsworth Editions Ltd. 1993) (1813).  
One particularly poignant literary perspective on the vicissitudes engendered by 
complex interests in estates in land is William Makepeace Thackeray’s The Luck of 
Barry Lyndon, published in 1844 but set in the mid 18th century.  See WILLIAM 
MAKEPEACE THACKERAY, THE LUCK OF BARRY LYNDON (Edgar F. Harden ed., Univ. of 
Michigan Press 1999) (1844).  Redmond Barry takes the name Barry Lyndon when 
he marries the wealthy widow of Lord Bullingdon.  But he holds only a life estate pur 
autre vie in the estate, which will devolve to his step-son who holds a future interest 
in the form of a fee simple subject to condition precedent and will take upon the 
death of his mother provided he has reached maturity.  Rhys Isaac’s The Transforma-
tion of Virginia, 1740–1790, is a brilliant study of role playing in genteel eighteenth 
century Virginia, laying great emphasis on the land as setting.  See RHYS ISAAC, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA, 1740–1790 (1999). 
 125 The Rule Against Perpetuities holds that “[n]o [contingent future] interest [in 
land] shall vest [in interest, not in possession], unless it must vest, if vest at all, within 
twenty-one years plus the period of gestation of a life in being at the time of its crea-
tion.”  Duke of Norfolk’s Case, (1862) 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch.).  The Rule in Shelley’s 
Case holds “[w]hen the ancestor, by any gift or conveyance, taketh an estate of free-
hold, and in the same gift or conveyance an estate is limited, either mediately or im-
mediately, to his heirs in fee or fee tail, ‘the heirs’ are words of limitation of the es-
MERKEL_FINAL 4/3/2008  9:41:47 AM 
2008] JEFFERSON’S FAILED ANTI-SLAVERY PROVISO 585 
 
gave rise to varied contingent current and future interests subject to 
eventual claims and conditions embodied in such forms as the fee on 
condition, the fee subject to condition subsequent, and fee subject to 
reversion.126  For every owner or tenant the law recognized a host of 
possible future replacements.  The current possessor had duties to 
these persons (many not yet in existence or even ascertainable) that re-
stricted what the “owner” could do with lands and buildings currently in 
his or her custody. 
Without working one’s way through a historically-minded case-
book on real property law,127 it is hard to appreciate the other-
worldliness of these conceptual assumptions about property.  The 
most important insight is that they are very unlike the modern liber-
tarian notions of ownership that Professor Appleby had in mind in 
exploring the property-focused ideals of market farmers in upstate 
New York who voted for Jefferson in 1796 or 1800, although these 
farmers may well have been articulating very liberal notions precisely 
because they desired to cast off the expressly feudal ideals of property 
held by the Hudson River patroons.128  Even more so than a jointly 
held life tenancy in marital property in a modern freehold encum-
tate, and not words of purchase.”  Shelley’s Case, (1581) 76 Eng. Rep. 199 (K.B.).  
The Doctrine of Worthier Titles holds that “[a]t common law, where a testator un-
dertook to devise to an heir exactly the same interest in land as such heir would take 
by descent, descent was regarded as the ‘worthier title’ and heir took by descent 
rather than devise.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1607 (6th ed. 1990).  The point to re-
viewing these conditions on alienation is that notions of “it (or he or she) is mine, 
and therefore I can do with it as I please” do not as readily resonate in Jefferson’s 
culture as we might assume. 
 126 See generally J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 248–97 
(4th ed. 2002); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 208–41 (2d ed. 1986). 
 127 A good example of a classic estates in land casebook is CASNER & LEACH, CASES 
AND TEXT ON PROPERTY, in any of the editions published between 1950 and 2000.  See, 
e.g., CASNER & LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY (3d ed. 1985).   More recent edi-
tions, reworked by younger authors, have forsaken the medieval heritage in favor of 
modern pragmatism. 
 128 See APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND NEW SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 66, at 4–5, 44.  On 
the remnants of feudal ideology in the Hudson River Valley and early nineteenth 
century landlord tenant disputes see REEVE HUSTON, LAND AND FREEDOM: RURAL 
SOCIETY, POPULAR PROTEST, AND PARTY POLITICS IN ANTEBELLUM NEW YORK (2000) and 
CHARLES W. MCCURDY, THE ANTI-RENT ERA IN NEW YORK LAW AND POLITICS, 1839–1865 
(2001).   John F. Hart’s work, illustrating the comprehensive nature of land use regu-
lation in colonial and early national America, while refuting Justice Scalia’s mis-
placed originalist assertions that regulation should trigger the Takings Clause, also 
aptly illustrates that the paradigmatic understanding of property in Jefferson’s day 
did not amount to an individualistic claim of absolute immunity against others’ rights 
and the public weal.  See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for 
Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996); John F. Hart, Land Use Law in 
the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099 
(2000). 
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bered by two mortgages and burdened by easements, restrictive cove-
nants, and zoning regulations, the real estate titles of Jefferson’s Vir-
ginia were complex and conflicted.  Cutting against all our Appleby-
ian intuitions, the quintessential liberal fixation with property as 
absolute and unassailable is actually Roman rather than Anglo-
American in origin—at least in so far as we are concerned with intel-
lectual provenance rather than popular resonance.  The Roman law 
notion of dominium, defining a unitary property interest consisting 
of usus, fructus, and abusus (right to possess, benefit from, and alien-
ate), was certainly familiar to Jefferson as an academic counterpoint 
to the common law, but dominium was foreign to the law and princi-
ples of the English speaking world.129  Paradoxically then, the prop-
erty that formed the third pillar of Locke’s triad alongside life and 
liberty was not quite Lockean as we know it  (or as Professor Abbleby 
knows it). 
While the property law of eighteenth century Virginia was arcane 
and opaque, it was also quotidian and ubiquitous.  The disputes that 
dominated Jefferson’s law practice from 1766 to 1772 were questions 
about real estate and many were incredibly intricate.130  In agrarian 
Virginia, ownership of land—perhaps more even than of slaves—
made a gentleman a gentleman, a planter a planter, and a freeman a 
 129 On the differences between Roman and Anglo-American property law in the 
eighteenth century, see RENE DAVID AND JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN 
THE WORLD TODAY 86 (1985) and sources cited therein; MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS AND CASES ON THE CIVIL AND 
COMMON LAW TRADITIONS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRENCH, GERMAN, ENGLISH AND 
EUROPEAN LAW 269–70 (2d ed. 1994); and JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN 
AMERICA 65–67 (2d. ed. 1985).   I look forward to consulting Thomas Jefferson’s Le-
gal Commonplace Book to acquire a deeper appreciation of his early exposure to Ro-
man law. The Commonplace Book contains Jefferson’s notes and summaries of his read-
ing as a law student from 1762–1767.  I am grateful to Professor David Konig for 
making his transcription available.  When published in the context of a major work 
on Jefferson’s legal thought, the Konig transcription will provide a great boom to Jef-
ferson scholarship, as the only serviceable way to consult the Legal Commonplace Book 
until now has been to visit the Huntingdon Library to review the manuscript.  As 
noted above, Jefferson cited civil law commentators—particularly Pufendorf—in his 
argument in Howell in 1770, so he certainly had some familiarity with civil law early in 
his career.  Shortly after he left Washington in 1809 he prepared an extensive and 
informed memorandum of civil law property issues involved in a dispute over title to 
alluvial mud flats in New Orleans.  See DUMBAULD, supra note 30, at 36–74.  Jefferson’s 
catalogue of books donated to the Library of Congress in 1812 includes over forty 
French and Latin titles on law in various non-English speaking countries, including 
the Codes of Justinian and Napoleon. 
 130 See generally FRANK L. DEWEY, THOMAS JEFFERSON, LAWYER (1986) (emphasizing 
Jefferson’s focus on real estate law); SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 2 (studying a highly 
complex real property case that Jefferson argued against George Wythe). 
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freeman.  Ownership of land not only had an exact analogy in Eng-
lish society, practice, and theory that slave-owning did not, it also ex-
tended across far wider segments of the population, down to the 
western farmers who made up Jefferson’s client base during his years 
at the bar. 
As a real property lawyer, Jefferson therefore had the intellectual 
equipment, engrained habits, and natural inclination to avoid falling 
into the property-focused trap that Finkelman described.  To be sure, 
slaves and masters had conflicting claims, but Jefferson’s understand-
ing of property hardly confined him to absolutist, uncompromising 
positions.  If anything, it did just the opposite.  Any supposition that 
Jefferson’s lawyerly notion of property in man was unqualified and 
indefeasible is further undermined by the fact that slaves were not 
considered personal property in Virginia until an act of the legisla-
ture in 1792 converted slaves from real estate to chattels personal.  
When Jefferson practiced law, and when he wrote the ordinance of 
1784, Virginia slaves were subject to most of the doctrines condition-
ing alienation that attached to land.131
In truth, Jefferson seldom, if ever, mentioned the sanctity of 
property in the context of slavery, except in a few rare instances 
where he distanced himself from those who supported slavery out of 
naked interest.  As a natural rights philosopher, a real Whig, and 
eventually a nascent romantic, Jefferson could readily acknowledge 
that black liberty trumped white claims of property.  In fact, it was not 
even close, as Jefferson suggested in his discussion of slave behavior 
in the Notes on Virginia, by pointing out that slaves’ disposition to theft 
was understandable given that deprivation of liberty has robbed them 
of all property.132  On several occasions Jefferson went one step fur-
ther and acknowledged that as a matter of morality, a slave rebel’s 
violent assertion of liberty had more merit than even a white owner’s 
right to life.  In broad terms, this is precisely the import of his famous 
statement in the Notes on Virginia respecting God’s judgment on Vir-
ginia’s slaveholding, and the Almighty’s certain siding with slaves in 
the event of a revolution.133  When slave revolt was attempted in 1800, 
 131 See THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1689–1860, at 66–71 
(1996).  Jefferson supported the 1792 revision to the law because it facilitated more 
equal partition of decedents’ estates.  Id. at 71. 
 132 JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA, supra note 16, at 142 (“That disposition to theft 
with which they have been branded, must be ascribed to their situation, and not to 
any depravity of the moral sense.  The man, in whose favour no laws of property can 
exist, probably feels himself less bound to respect those made in favour of others.”). 
 133 Id. at 163.   
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Jefferson responded consistently with the principles he had published 
and urged the rebels’ lives be spared on grounds of justification.134
But Jefferson’s views were by no means typical of his society.  If 
the Locekean premise on which Finkelman relies to explain Jeffer-
son’s inaction does not easily harmonize with Jefferson’s lawyerly 
worldview, property-based pro-slavery notions did resonate with a 
large segment of society.  The claim that property rights—particularly 
property rights in slaves—were so fundamental as to be immune from 
legal or political challenge figured prominently in the pro-slavery pe-
titions submitted from eight “blackbelt” counties in Southside and 
southwestern Virginia to the Virginia state legislature in 1784–85.  
The petitions, reprinted and analyzed by Frederika Teute Schmidt 
and Barbara Ripel Wilhelm in the William and Mary Quarterly, made 
their way to Richmond in five variations under 1,244 signatures.135  
They offer the clearest window into the reactionary popular attitudes 
of Virginians toward slavery that Jefferson habitually invoked when 
explaining his own cautious views on the subject of emancipation.136  
The immediate motivation behind the 1784–1785 petitions was a 
Methodist memorial received by the legislature urging emancipation, 
but the pro-slavery petitioners also took aim at the liberal manumis-
sion statute of 1782.  Although the Methodist memorial was unani-
mously rejected by the General Assembly, the pro-slavery petitioners 
were disturbed that it was not treated with more contempt and that 
the vote to repeal the manumission statute that followed its reading 
failed by a 52-35 margin.137
The pro-slavery petitioners’ approach to possible emancipation 
differed fundamentally from Jefferson’s in several respects, besides 
the issue of a property-focused right to insurrection against tyrannical 
government.  It is important in that context to stress the obvious 
And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have re-
moved their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people 
that these liberties are of the gift of God?  That they are not to be vio-
lated but with his wrath?  Indeed I tremble for my country when I re-
flect that God is just: that his justice cannot sleep for ever: that consid-
ering numbers, nature and natural means only, a revolution of the 
wheel of fortune, and exchange of situations is among possible events: 
that it may become probable by supernatural interference!  The Al-
mighty has no attribute which can take side with us in such a contest.   
Id. 
 134 For a detailed treatment, see generally Merkel, supra note 12. 
 135 See Schmidt & Wilhelm, supra note 33, at 133. 
 136 See e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Coles (Aug. 25, 1814), in 
9 WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 17, at 477–79. 
 137 Schmidt & Wilhelm, supra note 33, at 135. 
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point that Jefferson, unlike the petitioners or the founders of the 
Confederacy, never invoked the Declaration of Independence as an 
argument against abolition.138  On the most basic level, Jefferson ac-
cepted that emancipation was ultimately desirable, while the peti-
tioners were adamant in their insistence that emancipation must 
never come.  The petitioners and Jefferson differed also in important 
particulars.  First, the petitioners relied heavily on scriptural, specifi-
cally Old Testament authority, to make the case that slavery was le-
gitimate and therefore immune from legislative tampering.139  Sec-
ond, the petitioners’ essentially populist claims avoided all reference 
to secular authority except the American Revolution itself.  Their ar-
gument was in essence that having rebelled against Britain for at-
tempting to take colonists’ property by means of taxation, they were 
prepared to rebel against Virginia if the legislature attempted to take 
property by emancipation.140  Third, although the petitioners did not 
use the Calhounite phrase “positive good,” the clear import of their 
language was that as a useful and God-sanctioned institution, slavery 
was worthy on its own terms.141  Jefferson never made these claims; 
indeed, they are claims that are wholly un-Jeffersonian.  A fourth dif-
ference is that the petitioners maintained that black freedom was less 
valuable than white property, because by divine curse and fiat blacks 
were permanently inferior.142  This assertion is at odds with Jefferson’s 
careful distinction between equality of the moral sense (the basis for 
political and civil rights), and intellectual equality (which ideally had 
no bearing on a person’s or race’s rights and standing to participate 
in society).143
The one area of significant overlap between Jefferson’s attitudes 
and those of the petitioners is concern that free blacks would fall into 
idleness and resort to theft and other criminal behavior and that 
without the heavy hand of white social control, race war would be-
come likely.144  Yet here too, the approaches ultimately diverge, with 
 138 It is worth recalling the familiar point that Jefferson replaced “property,” the 
third prong of the Lockean triad of fundamental liberties, with the “pursuit of hap-
piness” in the Declaration, and that his list of grievances had far more to say about 
abridgement of constitutional processes and liberties than it did regarding property-
focused claims of immunity against taxation.  See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
(U.S. 1776).   
 139 See, e.g., Schmidt & Wilhelm, supra note 33, at 139. 
 140 See, e.g., id. at 140–41. 
 141 See, e.g., id. at 144. 
 142 See, e.g., id. at 145. 
 143 See MATTHEWS, supra note 78, at 53. 
 144 See JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA, supra note 16, at 138. 
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Jefferson referring to the scientific method and pleading caution 
pending further observation and the unfolding of beneficial envi-
ronmental conditions and the petitioners referring to Old Testament 
authority to explain permanent black perniciousness.145
Among Virginians, the chief objections to emancipation re-
mained solicitude for social stability on the part of cultivated intellec-
tuals like Jefferson and a naked commitment to private interest but-
tressed by scriptural support for slavery among less cosmopolitan, 
more material planters.146  Overt, secular pro-slavery was not particu-
larly rarefied in the revolutionary period.147  The right-to-property-
based pro-slavery view that surfaced in the Southside petitions was 
more populist than philosophical or jurisprudential.  Sophisticated 
defenses of slaveholding did not become a mainstay of southern ide-
ology until well into the nineteenth century.148  Indeed, as Robert 
Forbes reminds us, for most of its history Southern slavery was de-
fended chiefly on the basis of interest and power, not principle.149 
Certainly, during the period of the confederate government, the up-
per South’s slaveholding political leaders said little if anything favor-
ing slavery and left no record of any efforts to develop a property-
rights-centered pro-slavery theory.150  In sum, the Lockean petitions of 
 145 Cf. id. at 143; Schmidt & Wilhelm, supra note 33, at 145. 
 146 See Schmidt & Wilhelm, supra note 33, at 138–40 (reprinting the petitions). 
 147 It is interesting that only two of twenty-four classic articles reprinted in 
ARTICLES ON AMERICAN SLAVERY: PROSLAVERY THOUGHT, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICS (Paul 
Finkelman ed., 1989) [hereinafter PROSLAVERY THOUGHT] address the revolutionary 
period.  One of these, Schmidt & Wilhelm, supra note 33, deals not with the ideals of 
the elite, intellectual classes, but rather with a populist outcry against the social dislo-
cation that accompanied liberalization of Virginia’s manumission laws in 1782.  The 
other article touching the eighteenth century, Kenneth S. Greenberg, Revolutionary 
Ideology and the Proslavery Argument: The Abolition of Slavery in Antebellum South Carolina, 
42 J.S. HIST. 365 (1976), focuses chiefly on the later period.  And even South Caro-
lina’s most famous eighteenth century defense of slavery, voiced at the Constitutional 
Convention by Pierce Butler, was cast squarely in terms of interest rather than phi-
losophy.  See Pierce Butler, Speech at the Constitutional Convention (July 13, 1787), 
in 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 605 (rev. ed. 1966) (Max Far-
rand ed., 1911).  The remaining twenty-two case studies in Finkelman’s compendium 
deal with the period beginning with the Missouri Crisis. 
 148 See 2 MICHAEL O’BRIEN, CONJECTURES OF ORDER: INTELLECTUAL LIFE AND THE 
AMERICAN SOUTH, 1810–1860, at 938–92 (2004). 
 149 ROBERT P. FORBES, THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE AND ITS AFTERMATH: SLAVERY AND 
THE MEANING OF AMERICA 40–41, 148–55 (2007). 
 150 See generally MACLEOD, supra note 31.  MacLeod advances the argument that 
there was no need for overt pro-slavery until after the Missouri Crisis, when Northern 
opponents of slavery finally tired of waiting for slavery to die of its own accord in the 
South.  MacLeod makes the subtler and equally cogent point that Southerners such 
as Jefferson who objected to slavery on philosophical and moral grounds likewise de-
ceived themselves about the power of revolutionary ideals to end slavery with local 
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black-belt slave owners notwithstanding, the epistemology of property 
was not the major factor in Jefferson’s political and philosophical re-
lationship with chattel slavery in 1784 and never became a guiding 
concern for Jefferson, even in his more conservative old age. 
Besides focusing on overly rigid conceptions of property rights 
insufficiently attuned to Whiggish and common lawyerly fixations 
with estates in land, Finkelman’s argument that Jefferson laid little 
stock in the anti-slavery clause of 1784 struggles to accommodate di-
rect documentary evidence to the contrary.  Jefferson’s own pen at-
tests to the great weight he laid in the anti-slavery clause and to his 
grave disappointment at its narrow defeat.  In a letter dated April 25, 
1784 to Madison, now in the General Assembly in Richmond, Jeffer-
son lamented the clause’s failure and the want of that crucial single 
additional vote.151  “The act of Congress now inclosed,” Jefferson in-
structed his protégé, “extends not only to the territory ceded, but to be 
ceded.”152  He continued, 
You will observe two clauses struck out of the report, the 1st. re-
specting hereditary honours, the 2d. slavery.  The 1st. was done 
not from an approbation of such honours, but because it was 
thought an improper place to encounter them.  The 2d. was lost 
by an individual vote only.  Ten states were present.  The 4. East-
ern states, N. York, Pennsva. were for the clause.  Jersey would 
have been for it, but there were but two members, one of whom 
was sick in his chambers.  South Carolina Maryland and !Virginia! 
voted against it.  N. Carolina was divided as would have been Vir-
ginia had not one of it’s [sic] delegates been sick in bed.153
I have seen no other use of double exclamation points by Jefferson.  
This unusual punctuation speaks not only to the importance Jeffer-
son attached to the anti-slavery clause, but to his image of Virginia as 
an anti-slavery state, an image he assumed Madison would share.  
That he was surprised—even shocked—to see the Virginia delegation 
turn against mandatory emancipation in the West implies that, dur-
ing the Revolutionary period, Jefferson had genuine expectations of 
living to see the end of slavery in Virginia.  It also suggests that he still 
consent even where it was entrenched.  See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE 
CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 141–50 (1972). 
 151 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Apr. 25, 1784), in 7 PAPERS 
OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 118.  
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
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underestimated Virginia’s (and perhaps his own) attachment to the 
institution.154
A second letter bearing on the proposed emancipation clause is 
the subject of somewhat more ambiguous interpretation.  Jefferson’s 
letter of May 3, 1784, to his musical and literary friend and former 
colleague in Congress, Francis Hopkinson, pursued an ironic vein, 
and wondered whether prosecution for libel might lie against Pennsyl-
vania Packet editor “Claypole for publishing in his gazette of April 27. 
as an act of Congress a paper which certainly was no act of theirs, and 
which contained a principle or two not quite within the level of their 
politics.”155  Claypole apparently had not printed the final version of 
the Ordinance of 1784 as adopted on April 23, but printed Jefferson’s 
revised report that still contained the clauses against slavery and he-
reditary titles.  Jefferson labeled this earlier revised report “a pre-
tended act for dividing the western country into states and fixing the 
principles on which their governments should be erected, two of 
which as this forgery [Claypole’s published report] pretends were an 
exclusion of hereditary honours, and an abolition of slavery.”156  He 
then assured Hopkinson that “[w]hen the true act shall be published 
you will find no such pettyfogging ideas in it.”157
Finkelman argues that Jefferson’s ironic style in his letter to 
Hopkinson implies a lack of seriousness regarding anti-slavery.  But a 
slightly jocular tone (if indeed it was that, rather than a bluntly sar-
castic one) does not necessarily mean Jefferson took anti-slavery 
lightly.  After all, one often hears ironic comments about the current 
President’s foreign and environmental policies from people who find 
those policies deeply disturbing.  Similarly, Jefferson, who was always 
sensitive about the fate of legislation he sponsored, likely felt some 
bitterness and frustration at Congress’ rejection of two high princi-
ples of his western design.  This is Dumas Malone’s reading, and 
while Malone’s sympathetic views of Jefferson’s relation to slavery are 
certainly informed by his New South roots in Jim Crow Mississippi, 
Malone’s argument actually focuses on the clause barring titles of 
nobility.158  Jefferson was then thoroughly exercised over the Society 
of Cincinnati, as much because of its hereditary character as because 
 154 See MACLEOD, supra note 31, at 126–30 (on elite attachment to slavery); see gen-
erally Schmidt & Wilhelm, supra note 33 (on pressure from small slaveholders to pre-
serve the institution). 
 155 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Francis Hopkinson (May 3, 1784), in 7 PAPERS 
OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 205. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 MALONE, supra note 20, at 415–16. 
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of its military tenor, and in meetings with Washington he stressed the 
importance of moderating the aristocratic image of the Society of 
Cincinnati.159  This counsel to Washington concerning the dangers of 
aristocracy, along with his regretful report to Madison about narrow-
ness of the anti-slavery clause’s defeat, and his low overall impression 
of Congress (an impression very widely shared)160 all suggest Jefferson 
considered the failure of the two clauses a product of low-mindedness 
rather than a subject for jesting.  There is also perhaps some sense of 
embarrassment that the matter was taken up prematurely in the pa-
pers.  Diffidence was foreign to Jefferson regarding most issues, but 
not anti-slavery.  In this regard Jefferson may have felt uneasy that 
Claypole’s publication of the uncensored ordinance might involve 
him in public controversy in his home constituency, something Jef-
ferson sought to avoid following his recent travails at the hands of 
public and legislative critics of his handling of the British invasion 
during his governorship.161  Wariness respecting public censure of his 
failed anti-slavery proposals mirrored his reluctance to publish the 
Notes on Virginia and their strictures against slavery in America.162
IV. WOULD THE CLAUSE HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE? 
Those who argue that the failed anti-slavery clause of the Territo-
rial Government Act has been overestimated also focus on the Old 
Southwest.  The argument here is that even if the fifth provision of 
Jefferson’s Charter of Compact had been allowed to stand, and even 
if the Ordinance of 1784 had not been superseded by the Ordinance of 
1787, it would have had little effect on the development of Alabama, 
Mississippi, and Tennessee.  This claim too has been advanced most 
adamantly by Professor Finkelman: “It is difficult to imagine how Jef-
ferson’s proposal would have worked, had it been accepted; by 1800 
some of the territories probably would have had large slave popula-
tions and politically powerful masters who would have worked to un-
dermine the Ordinance of 1784, had it included Jefferson’s prohibi-
 159 Id. at 415. 
 160 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 185 (1996). 
 161 On Jefferson’s reaction to public censure and legislative inquiry concerning his 
handling of the British invasion during his governorship, see MALONE, supra note 20, 
at 361–69. 
 162 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Francois Jean, Chevelier de Chastellux 
(Sept. 2, 1785), in 8 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 467–69.  For a discussion 
of Jefferson’s reluctance to circulate the Notes on Virginia, see JOSEPH J. ELLIS, 
AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 85–90 (1997). 
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tion.”163  Finkelman’s critique aims at the Northwest as well as South-
west; his point is not simply that Jefferson’s clause would not have 
prevented slavery spreading into Alabama and Mississippi, but that it 
would have eased the growth of slavery in Indiana and Illinois.164
Finkelman’s assertion has some purchase.  Doubtless, slave mas-
ters in the West would have endeavored to perfect their property 
claims against would-be emancipationists, but it is equally true that in 
every modern jurisdiction where slavery existed, politically powerful 
masters resisted the imposition of anti-slavery legislation.  In all of 
those jurisdictions, however, slavery was eventually overthrown—by 
internal political means in the American North and Midwest, by revo-
lution in Haiti, by imposition of imperial legislation in the British 
colonies, by military conquest in the American South, and by surren-
der to world opinion and Anglo-American economic coercion in Bra-
zil and Cuba.165  If Jefferson’s termination clause had passed in 1784, 
its prospects would have compared favorably to abolition laws that ul-
timately proved successful in other regions.  Even as late as 1800, 
when emancipation was scheduled to take effect, the situation in 
large areas of the Trans-Appalachian American West (Tennessee and 
the entire Northwest)166 more closely resembled that in northeastern 
states where slaveowners acquiesced unhappily but peacefully in abo-
lition by political means than that which ultimately developed in the 
ante-bellum Southwest in the absence of a Federal slavery-
termination provision. 
In reflecting on the prospects for slavery’s western expansion 
and entrenchment in the United States of 1784, it is useful to bear in 
mind that the United States did not then include Spanish Louisiana, 
with its heavy slave populations in the regions surrounding New Or-
leans.  In the 1780s, whites owned only a handful of slaves in the terri-
tory comprising the modern states of Alabama and Mississippi, and 
even in the more densely settled Tennessee region of North Carolina 
 163 Finkelman, Northwest Ordinance, supra note 29, at 353.  Not that Finkelman’s 
position is idiosyncratic; William Wiecek, for example, adopts the same reasoning in 
WIECEK, supra note 35, at 60. 
 164 PROSLAVERY THOUGHT, supra note 147, at 369–70. 
 165 See generally ROBIN BLACKBURN, THE OVERTHROW OF COLONIAL SLAVERY, 1776–
1848 (1988); DAVIS, supra note 103; DAVID BRION DAVIS, SLAVERY AND HUMAN 
PROGRESS (1984). 
 166 According to the Federal Census of 1800, Tennessee had a black population of 
13.2%, of whom 97.8% were enslaved.  See Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical 
Census Statistics on Population Totals By Race, 1790 to 1990, and By Hispanic Ori-
gin, 1970 to 1990, For The United States, Regions, Divisions, and States (U.S. Census 
Bureau Population Division, Working Paper, No. 56, 2002), available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0056/tab57.pdf. 
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and Kentucky region of Virginia slavery was not yet firmly rooted.167  
To assess the potential efficacy of Jefferson’s provision, the precise is-
sue therefore is not whether the Southwest that came into existence 
by 1800 in the absence of the anti-slavery clause would have acqui-
esced in emancipation, but whether a Southwest that would have de-
veloped between 1784 and 1800 with emancipation scheduled for 
1800 would have been settled by politically powerful slavemasters with 
large numbers of slaves and the clout to resist or overturn the eman-
cipation law.  Addressing this question requires consideration of an-
other closely related criticism of the deleted clause of 1784—also ar-
gued forcefully by Professor Finkelman—to wit, that Jefferson’s 
Ordinance lacked an enforcement clause.168
This particular critique is somewhat puzzling in that it is nakedly 
anachronistic.  A noted constitutional historian, Professor Finkelman 
is certainly aware that enforcement clauses did not enter into Ameri-
can constitutionalism until passage of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments, which makes his decision to condemn Jefferson for not in-
cluding one in 1784 difficult to comprehend.  To be sure, the 
introduction of enforcement clauses in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
and Fifteenth Amendments reflected the greater powers Congress ar-
rogated to itself at the time of their passage—powers which may well 
have been necessary to wipe all vestiges of slavery off the statute books 
where the institution was deeply ingrained169 and powers which the 
Congress, established by the Articles of Confederation, clearly 
lacked.170  But Finkelman’s criticism regarding the absence of an en-
forcement clause could be leveled against any pre-Civil War legisla-
tion, including Nathan Dane’s (and/or Rufus King’s) Northwest Or-
dinance, the provision Finkelman so much prefers to the failed clause 
of 1784.171
An enforcement provision, giving Congress authority to imple-
ment powers it had itself just proclaimed, was without the realm of 
possibility under the Articles of Confederation.  The states had dele-
 167 See BARNHART, supra note 85, at 37–44, 135–137 (stating that western popula-
tion figures before the first federal census of 1790 are at best speculative). 
 168 See FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 7, at 44. 
 169 See ACKERMAN, supra note 34, at 131; FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 38, at 
199. 
 170 For a trenchant analysis of Congressional weakness under the Articles, see 
RAKOVE, supra note 160, at 23–56.  However, for a famous argument that government 
under the Articles was far less futile than popular memory would have it, see JENSEN, 
supra note 47. 
 171 See PROSLAVERY THOUGHT, supra note 147, at 353.  Dane is generally credited 
with inserting the anti-slavery aspects of article VI, while King is blamed for the fugi-
tive slave clause.  Id. 
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gated no authority for Congress to augment its own powers, absent an 
amendment agreed unanimously by the legislatures of each state.172  
However, something very nearly as useful—the plenary powers inher-
ent in sovereignty (called the police powers a generation later)173—
did exist respecting the West, and this realization was commonplace 
in the constitutional discourse of the day.  Assuming that the transfer 
of sovereignty over the West from the old states to Congress was 
complete pending the re-delegation of that sovereignty to the new 
territories and states as they emerged, the doctrine that Congress had 
the power to act with reference to the National Domain did not then 
need to await the rise of enforcement clauses.174  Perhaps ironically, 
 172 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (U.S. 1781); see generally RAKOVE, supra 
note 160, at 25.   On the issue of the more limited assertions of authority in the Ter-
ritorial Governance’s Act being ultra vires, see 6 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 18, 
at 587–88 (ed. note).  Clearly the same considerations apply to the Northwest Ordi-
nance.  My point is that the ultra vires problem would hardly disappear on account of 
the Confederation Congress announcing ipse dixit that it had the authority to do what 
it had just done.  That said, the Congressional power grab could still be legitimated 
through the development of a new convention in the Diceyian sense, through popu-
lar ratification in the Ackermanian sense, or through the ratification of a new consti-
tutional instrument recognizing the national government’s plenary authority over 
the western territories. 
 173 According to David Watson, the phrase “police powers” was first used to de-
scribe the authority of states to regulate their internal affairs by Justice Story in Prigg 
v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).  1 DAVID K. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS HISTORY, APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 598–99 (1910).  
In Prigg, Story held that the federal Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 was constitutional and 
that state officials ought to enforce it, but that the federal government could not 
compel state officials to act in that or any other capacity.  See 41 U.S. 539. 
 174 ONUF, supra note 21, at 41–46 (exploring the rising consensus among members 
of the Confederation Congress in the 1780s that national authority over the ceded 
western territories was absolute, subject only to the conditions attached to the grants 
of cession by Virginia and the other ceding states).  Congressional action infringing 
on state sovereignty was a different story under the Articles and also later in the ante-
bellum years of co-sovereignty and dual federalism under the Constitution.  But in 
the West, there were, as yet, no states to be co-sovereign.  Hence, the police power, 
that is, the power to legislate for general purposes of safety, health, welfare, and mor-
als inherent in sovereignty, clearly resided with Congress respecting territories not 
yet admitted as states.  Prior to Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), this 
remained the orthodox understanding under the Constitution of 1788 as it had been 
under the Articles, so much so that during the Missouri Crisis President Monroe’s 
cabinet—which included Southerners John C. Calhoun, William H. Crawford, and 
William Wirt—advised unanimously that the plenary federal power over the territo-
ries included the power to prohibit slavery.  See WIECEK, supra note 35, at 115; see also 
Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).  One could also make a case by 
analogy to the law of treaties that the anti-slavery clause of 1784 would have been self-
executing; that is, that no further domestic (namely, state or territorial) legislation 
would have been required to give it legal effect.  As previously noted, the language of 
the fifth article of the Compact closely tracked the future language of Section One of 
the Thirteenth Amendment.  I take it to be fairly orthodox that Section One is in fact 
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Finkelman’s suggestion that no positive anti-slavery action was possi-
ble before the advent of the enforcement clause is not only ahistori-
cal; rather, it exonerates Jefferson of any lethargy on the anti-slavery 
front, precisely because he lived and died long before the Thirteenth 
Amendment became law. 
In sum, there is something rather circular and illogical about 
Finkelman’s approach to this issue.  He starts with the pre-
supposition that Jefferson was pro-slavery, and therefore could not 
have wholly supported any radical anti-slavery proposal.175  Next, he 
argues that the anti-slavery clause of 1784 was too radical and preco-
cious to have been effective, for which reason historians should not 
afford its author any credit.176  He finally suggests that this visionary 
quality shows, of all things, that Jefferson did not take the measure 
seriously himself.177  The most serious flaw in Finkelman’s argument, 
however, derives not from the incompatibility of its several underly-
ing premises, but from its failure to account for a crucial factor: the 
deterrent effect of the clause on slaveholders contemplating migra-
tion into the southwestern territories. 
At other places in his narrative, and in other contexts, he treats 
this deterrent effect in considerable detail.  For instance, in his dis-
cussion of the pro-slavery petitions of French inhabitants that fol-
lowed passage of the Northwest Ordinance in 1787, Finkelman writes 
that “when the Congress failed to respond positively to their peti-
tions, many of the French settlers voted with their feet.”178  Finkelman 
clearly is too careful a scholar not to recognize that an anti-slavery 
self-enforcing:  That “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction” is, from a de jure per-
spective, the end of the story—countervailing state or federal law is simply nugatory, 
and cannot legally be applied.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.  The Enforcement 
Clause, set out in Section Two, gives Congress further authority to provide for police 
action against non-compliant supporters of the old system of coerced labor or its 
equivalents and also to reach the badges and incidents of slavery.  Id. § 2.  It is fairly 
straightforward, then, to argue that Jefferson’s failed anti-slavery clause would have 
had the same reach (in terms of subject matter, not geography) as Section One of 
the Thirteenth Amendment; that is, it would have prohibited slavery (but not badges 
and incidents like segregation or black codes) on its own terms, even without further 
legislative action.  Legal effect and compliance are, of course, different questions, 
but those additional powers to compel compliance that Congress acquired respect-
ing former slave states by virtue of Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment were unnecessary respecting the territories—at least prior to Dred Scott’s un-
supportable claim that Congressional authority over the territories pertained only to 
regulation of land as land. 
 175 See Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery, supra note 1, at 181, 186. 
 176 See id. at 199. 
 177 See id. at 199–200. 
 178 See Finkelman, Northwest Ordinance, supra note 29, at 363. 
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law—even one without an enforcement clause—could create suffi-
cient uncertainty among slaveholders to drive them and their human 
property from a territory.  “With the passage of the [Northwest Ordi-
nance],” Finkelman continues, citing a letter to the Territorial Gov-
ernor, “‘many aggravating circumstances rumored that the very mo-
ment’ the territorial governor arrived ‘all their slaves would be set 
free.’  Thus a ‘panic seized upon their minds’ and the wealthiest set-
tlers sought ‘from the Spanish Government that security which they 
conceived was refused to them’ by the United States”179  But why 
would no similar logic of deterrence apply to the Ordinance of 1784?  
If an anti-slavery ordinance could drive slaveholders from their 
homes in the Northwest, surely it could also have kept other slave-
owners from moving into the unsettled areas of the Southwest.  If 
these territories, because of their climate, held out the potential for 
greater returns on slave labor than those north of the Ohio, the 
scope of investment required for plantation-based agriculture also 
entailed far greater risks where the future of slave property was un-
certain.180
To be fair, this problem of inconsistency on deterrence does not 
wholly escape Finkelman’s notice.  But even his effort to forestall 
criticism on this account seems more geared toward condemning Jef-
ferson than toward historical explanation.  “Those slaveowners who 
remained in the Northwest Territory,” Finkelman writes, “quickly dis-
covered that the words of the ordinance were much like the words of 
the Declaration of Independence.”181  He lays great stock in the local 
anti-slavery efforts of the next generation of Northwesterners, rather 
than those of the nation’s Founding Fathers, but he cannot ultimately 
escape the deep commitment of these very Northwesterners to the 
anti-slavery principles and legacies they associated with the Founding 
Fathers, most especially with Jefferson himself.182  Indeed, Finkel-
man’s whole history of Northwestern pro-slavery is an account of ef-
forts to overthrow Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance, justify slave 
constitutions in the face of that Ordinance, and discount the anti-
slavery legacy of the Founders.  As Finkelman reports, the most com-
 179 Id. (citing Letter from Bartholomew Tardiveau to Arthur St. Clair (June 30, 
1789), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 117–18 (William Henry Smith ed., 1882)). 
 180 On slaveholders in the United States as cost benefit analyzers and rational 
economic actors, see ROBERT FOGEL & STANLEY ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE 
ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1974). 
 181 PROSLAVERY THOUGHT, supra note 147, at 363. 
 182 See id. at 367–69; see also FONER, FREE SOIL, supra note 38, at 84;  PETERSON, supra 
note 5, at 189–209. 
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mon refrain of these pro-slavery campaigners was that Article VI was 
keeping wealthy slave owners out of the Territories.183
While rejecting the notion that Jefferson’s free-soil clause would 
have had no effect, I do not mean to suggest that the clause would 
necessarily have prevented slavery from becoming firmly established 
anywhere in the Southwest.  It would most likely have affected the 
northernmost and most mountainous portions of the Old Southwest, 
in which slavery never became as widely and firmly established as it 
did in Alabama and Mississippi.  Kentucky was not part of the original 
Virginia cession, and the Bluegrass State never went through a terri-
torial stage, passing instead directly out of Virginia into full member-
ship in the Union in 1792.184  North Carolina’s cession of Tennessee 
did not take place until North Carolina ratified the Constitution in 
1789, at which point Congress took over administering the Territory 
South of the Ohio, leading eventually to Tennessee’s admission in 
1796.185  Regarding the remainder of the Old Southwest, it is all but 
certain that South Carolina and Georgia never would have made 
their cessions had Jefferson’s provision remained in force, and even 
without an anti-slavery provision in place, conflicting Spanish claims, 
Indian wars, and complex Georgia politics involving various factions 
of well connected speculators with conflicting claims to Indian lands 
in the Yazoo delayed establishment of the Mississippi Territory (com-
prising the future states of Mississippi and Alabama) until 1798.186  At 
that time, Congress considered but rejected legislation that would 
have prohibited slavery in the new territory.187
For the future states of Kentucky and Tennessee, however, ap-
proval of Jefferson’s anti-slavery clause in 1784 would have created a 
period of substantial uncertainty, and any uncertainty worked against 
the immigration of slaveholders.  Demographic history prior to the 
first federal census of 1790 is inexact, but even in 1790 Tennessee 
(The United States Territory South of the Ohio) had a black popula-
tion of only 10.6% (of whom 90.4% were enslaved), similar to New 
York’s (7.6%, of whom 82.1% were enslaved) or New Jersey’s (7.7 %, 
of whom 80.5% were enslaved), where slave owners lacked sufficient 
clout to prevent emancipation by political means.188  Whether slave 
 183 PROSLAVERY THOUGHT, supra note 147, at 368 
 184 ABERNATHY, supra note 77, at 69–73. 
 185 Id. at 60. 
 186 For a meticulous account of the events leading to the creation of the Missis-
sippi Territory, see id. at 136–216. 
 187 See DAVIS, supra note 103, at 30. 
 188 For census figures for these states for 1790, see Gibson & Jung, supra note 166, 
at http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0056/tab57.pdf (Ten-
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owners would have streamed in to Tennessee in the 1790s with 
emancipation scheduled for 1800 is open to doubt.  While Kentucky’s 
black population for the 1790 census (conducted in the district which 
was then still part of Virginia) was already 17% (99.1% of whom were 
enslaved),189 it is questionable whether slaveowners would have risked 
establishing themselves in the region after 1784 with Jefferson’s 
clause and its 1800 deadline looming over all territories to be 
ceded.190  This marginal uncertainty may have been determinative, 
and even in 1792, state constitutional sanction of slavery was only 
achieved after a hard fight in the convention.191  Immigrants into 
Kentucky between 1784 and 1792 could not have foreseen that Ken-
tucky would never pass into territorial status, or that they would win 
constitutionalization of slavery at the time of statehood, even if the 
eventual separation of the region from Virginia was expected by the 
time of the Territorial Governance Act.  All this is of course hypo-
thetical, but while I cannot show that Jefferson’s provision would have 
reduced the eventual number of slave states, neither can Finkelman 
show that it would not have.192
nessee), http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0056/tab45.pdf 
(New Jersey), http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0056/tab47. 
pdf (New York).  New York adopted a gradual emancipation statute in 1799; New Jer-
sey did so in 1804.  The last decennial census showing a slave population for New 
York is 1840 (four slaves); for New Jersey, the census of 1860 reports eighteen slaves.  
On slaveowner (and other) resistance to emancipation in these states, and in the 
North generally, see ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF 
SLAVERY IN THE NORTH (1967). 
 189 For Kentucky census data, see Gibson & Jung, supra note 166, at http://www. 
census.gov/population/documentation/twps0056/tab32.pdf . 
 190 I am assuming that the overwhelming majority of slaveowners and slaves pre-
sent in Kentucky in 1790 arrived in the 1780s, as it is improbable that there were 
many slaves in this war-ravaged frontier region beyond the Proclamation Line prior 
to the establishment of peace in 1783.  Indeed, those that were there certainly had 
every opportunity to flee during the War.   Moreover, the total population of 184,139 
for 1790 is more than nine times that of the 20,000 estimated for 1782, so even if 
slavery had a foothold before the war’s end, the vast majority of slaves and slavemas-
ters came later. 
 191 See ABERNATHY, supra note 77, at 70–72. 
 192 It is noteworthy that Malone boldly claimed that passage of the fifth plank 
would have made secession impracticable, if not impossible.  See MALONE, supra note 
20, at 414.  I find Malone’s observation especially intriguing in that it takes for 
granted that secession was undesirable, suggesting how large a gap separates South-
ern apologists of the tragic-blunder school from the more militant Southern parti-
sans of the current day such as CHARLES ADAMS, WHEN IN THE COURSE OF HUMAN 
EVENTS: ARGUING THE CASE FOR SOUTHERN SECESSION (2000); THOMAS DILORENZO, 
THE REAL LINCOLN: A NEW LOOK AT ABRAHAM LINCOLN, HIS AGENDA, AND AN 
UNNECESSARY WAR (2002); and JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL, EMANCIPATING SLAVES, 
ENSLAVING FREE MEN: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1996), whose scholar-
ship is savaged in Daniel Ferber, Libertarians in the Attic, or a Tale of Two Narratives, 32 
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In the end, there is no need to dwell on hypothetical history.  
Both Paul Finkelman and Peter Onuf have demonstrated that the 
anti-slavery provision of the Northwest Ordinance was widely held 
among residents of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois to have had precisely 
the effect that Finkelman denies Jefferson’s plank could have had in 
the Southwest.193  Boosters in these territories urged pro-slavery state 
constitutions in the hopes of overcoming their regions perceived dis-
advantages relative to Kentucky.  The Old Northwest attracted a 
trickle of slave owners ready to take their chances that the anti-slavery 
plank would be repealed (even though by the terms of the Ordinance 
it could not be) or that state constitutions would depart from the Or-
dinance and sanction slave holding.  Meanwhile, Kentucky, with a 
narrowly-won slave constitution, attracted slave owners by the thou-
sands.194  Most masters did not wish to chance their property for the 
sake of slavery’s expansion.  Some fifty years later during the Kansas 
crisis, another generation of slaveowners behaved in precisely the 
same way.  Border Ruffians may have crossed over from Missouri in 
droves to vote slavery, but settling with their human property 
amounted to a very different story.  There were never more than a 
few hundred bondsmen in Kansas while one hundred thousand 
toiled on the other side of the Missouri border.195
As in the Northwest and in Kansas, so in British Trinidad and 
Guyana, slaveholders were deterred from immigration, investment, 
and long-term commitments by even the vaguest and most indefinite 
anti-slavery laws, and, to a surprising degree, even by rumors of im-
pending metropolitan or national anti-slavery pronouncements.  No 
federal law as strong as Jefferson’s anti-slavery plank of 1784 obtained 
in any slave-holding region of the United States before the Civil War.  
However, aggressive British regulation of West Indian slavery in the 
period leading up to emancipation and apprenticeship seems to have 
curtailed the growth of slavery in the islands very sharply, even in the 
virgin territories acquired during the Napoleonic Wars.196  If they be-
haved like their West Indian counterparts, some slaveowners in the 
REV. AM. HIST. 184 (1984).  Like Malone, I have much more empathy for the Lost 
Clause than the Lost Cause.   But Finkelman’s position on this issue is not wholly 
idiosyncratic.  It is endorsed by William Freehling—himself perhaps not always the 
model of orthodox opinion.  See FREEHLING, supra note 31, at 585 n.36. 
 193 Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery, supra note 1, at 362–63; ONUF, supra note 56, at 
116–117. 
 194 See FREEHLING, supra note 31, at 139. 
 195 See DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS: 1848–1861, at 199–204 (Don E. 
Fehrenbacher ed., 1976).  
 196 See DAVIS, supra note 103, at 441–43. 
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Old Southwest may have fought to overturn the clause before it took 
effect in 1800, but many others would have stayed away or sold their 
slaves to seaboard slave owners.197  It is impossible to say how much 
Jefferson’s clause would have slowed the spread of slavery into the 
Southwest, but that it would have slowed it—especially in the more 
marginal areas for slave production—is very likely. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The failed anti-slavery provision of 1784 is perhaps one of the 
most significant legislative clauses that never was.  Quite apart from 
questions respecting its likely effects on the future spread of slavery if 
it had taken effect, the provision established an important milestone 
in the history of anti-slavery constitutionalism in the United States, 
marking out the first attempt to write free-soil provisions into a na-
tional constitutional instrument.198  It also forms part of a larger re-
publican constitutional vision for the West and for the nation.  Jeffer-
son took a leading role in mapping out a western design premised on 
federalism rather than colonialism, and committed to republican 
principles of governance.199  He recognized that those principles 
could not accommodate slavery or slaveholding.  The Territorial 
Governance Act of 1784 also marks the high point of Jefferson’s anti-
slavery politics.  A month after the Act became law, Jefferson sailed 
for Paris, and soon after his return to the United States in December 
1788, his personal indebtedness, his commitments to the special in-
terests of Virginia in national politics, and his reaction to the revolu-
tion in Haiti began to sap away at his anti-slavery principles.  As the 
1790s ran their course and the Haitian Revolution became ever more 
violent, Jefferson’s growing inability to envision large scale post-
emancipation coexistence and cooperation of whites and blacks in 
the great experimental republic he helped found wholly undermined 
his desire to bring about a near-term end to slavery.200  But a genera-
tion after he was gone, the anti-slavery vision of the West he articu-
 197 That Southerners would behave like white West Indians may perhaps seem a 
strange assumption.  Southerners, after all, were Southerners for a lifetime, and not 
sojourning profiteers in exotic, dangerous, and alien lands.  But in other respects, 
their behavior could correspond to that of West Indians (and West India interest 
men): they were economic actors, who planned their investment decisions—
including where to locate and how many slaves to buy—around cost benefit analysis.  
The prospect that slavery might be abolished was by necessity a crucial element in 
this calculus. 
 198 See WIECEK, supra note 35, at 60. 
 199 See ONUF, supra note 45, at 76. 
 200 Merkel, supra note 32, at 265–320. 
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lated during the 1780s became a mainstay of Free Soil and Republi-
can Party principles, and a crucial contributor to the politics of 
emancipation.  Less racist than Jefferson, more bold in their faith in 
coexistence, and unencumbered by personal interests in slavehold-
ing, the Republican Party of the 1860s secured the free-soil vision un-
der the reconstructed Constitution that Jefferson first articulated un-
der the Articles of Confederation.201  In the Thirteenth Amendment, 
they chose Jefferson’s words of 1784, passed down through the 
Northwest Ordinance and all state constitutions of the Old North-
west, to prohibit slavery throughout the United States forever.202
 
 201 See RICHARD J. CARWARDINE, LINCOLN: PROFILES IN POWER (2003); see generally 
FONER, FREE SOIL, supra note 38; PETERSON, supra note 5, at 162–64. 
 202 The failed Anti-Slavery provision proclaimed “[t]hat after the year 1800 of the 
Christian era, there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the 
said states, otherwise than in punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted to have been personally guilty.”  ORDINANCE OF 1784, supra note 22.  
The Thirteenth Amendment provides that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 1.  Cf. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (1818); IND. CONST. art. XI, § 
7 (1816); MICH. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (1837); MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2 (1858); 
OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (1802); WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (1848); NORTHWEST 
ORDINANCE art. VI (1787). 
